Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for iquashing of FIR No. 184 of 2020, dated 06.07.2020, registered at Police Station Haroli, District Una, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 324, 326, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 25 of the Arms Act based on a compromise effected between the parties.

2. It has been asserted that the parties have settled the matter with the intervention of the respectable members of society. The informant does not want to proceed further with the matter after the compromise. Hence, the present petition.

3. I have heard Mr Dipankar, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner and Mor Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for Respondent nos. 1 and 2/State.

4. Mr Dipankar, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner, submitted that the parties have settled the matter and there is no impediment in quashing the F.I.R. based on the compromise effected between the parties. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:

 Manpreet Singh vs. State of Punjab & others 2025 PHHC-054473; and

 Sanjay Thakur vs. State of H.P. & Ors. Cr.MMO No.329 of 2024 decided on 21.06.2024.

5. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondents No.1 and 2, submitted that F.I.R. has been registered for the commission of offences punishable under Section 25 of the Arms Act, which is a heinous offence; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

6. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

7. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings under section 482 based on the com promise is different from the jurisdiction of compoundring under section 320 of CrPC. It was observed:

57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of the offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320. The court is guided solely and squarely thereby. On the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence, criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power. However, the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of the indictment.

58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts that have harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of society, and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corrupution Act or the offences comm