Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral)

1. The present appeal arises out of the order as passed by learned District Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. dated 01.08.2024, whereby application under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “1996 Act”) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was dismissed.

2. The facts of the case are that the land belonging to the respondent was acquired by the present appellant for the construction of Bilaspur Ner Chowk Section of National Highway (four-lane road). The competent authority passed an award dated 27.11.2013 in favour of the present respondent and assessed the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs.58,000,00/- per bigha and further the valuation of the structure was done separately, as per the award.

3. Feeling dissatisfied, the claimant/Respondent invoked the provisions of Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act against the award dated 27.11.2013. Learned Arbitrator, vide its award dated 10.02.2022, partly allowed the application under Section 3G(5) of National Highways Act as filed by the claimant/respondent. The learned Arbitrator rejected the claim qua enhancement, but granted all statutory benefits in terms of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.7064 of 2019, titled as Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh and others, decided on 19.09.2019 in favour of the respondent.

4. Against the award, as passed by learned Divisional Commissioner exercising the powers of an Arbitrator under the National Highways Act, dated 10.02.2022, the present appellant filed and application under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act read with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 before the Learned District Judge, Mandi, who vide its impugned order dated 01.08.2024, dismissed the application under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

5. Feeling aggrieved against the impugned order passed by learned District Judge Mandi, the National Highway Authority of India has filed the instant appeal, invoking the provisions of Section 37 of the 1996 Act.

6. It is contended by Mr. Sumefet Raj Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, that the impugned order as passed by the learned District Judge, Mandi, is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He further submits that the appellant has furnished sufficient reasons, which are reasonable and plausible, for non-filing of the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act within the prescribed period of limitation, therefore, the learned District Judge has wrongly dismissed the application under Section 34(3) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in an illegal manner.

7. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Senior counsel, duly assisted by Ms. Tamanna Sharma, Advocate, contended that as per the mandate as laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, especially in view of the provisions of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act and the proviso thereto, 90 days plus 30 days period cannot be extended. In the present case, the objection under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was admittedly filed by the present appellant on 08.04.2024 which is more than 5 months after the passing of the award by the learned Arbitrator.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and scanned the case file.

9. The only point to be deterfmined by this Court is whether the application under Section 34/objection as filed by the present appellant was filed within a period of limitation or not.

10. The provisions of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act read as follows:

“(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the