An application for extension of time to pass an arbitral award under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, requires the applicant to demonstrate 'sufficient cause' for the delay; mere filing of the application, especially after an inordinate delay, without substantiated grounds, does not warrant judicial extension.

Virender Singh, Judge

1. H Petitioner-Rajender Kumar, has filed the present application under Section 29(A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), against the order dated 11.01.2023, passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Arbitrator) in case No. 620/2018, titled as ‘Rajender Kumar Versus National Highway Authority of India & Anr.’ (Petition-cum-appeal under Section 3 (G) 5 of the National Highway Act, 1956).

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2. The present application has been filed, on the ground, that the land of the applicant wasH acquired for the purpose of widening/four-laning of National Highway 21.

3. It is the further case of the applicant that his case, along with the other connected cases, was taken up on 11.01.2023, and the case was listed for evidence of the applicant.

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4. Thoe order passed by the learned Arbitrator is stated to be bad, as, without any fault on the part of the applicant, mandate of arbitration has been terminated, and the case has been ordered to be kept in abeyance.

5. It is the further case of the applicant that the learned Arbitrator is required to refer the matter to this Court for extension of time, instead of keeping the case in abeyance, as, the proceedings are required to be completed within six months.

6. According to the applicant, he could not approach this Court for extension of time, due to the fact that his wife was unwell and was under treatment with PGI Chandigarh.

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7. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to extend the time, with a direction to the Arbitra.tor to decide the matter in a time bound manner.

8. When put to notice, the appliHcation has been contested by respondent No. 2, on the ground, that Section 29(A) of the Act provides time limit for arbitral award. In the present case, arbitral award could not be passed within twelve months and thereafter, no extension of time has been sought by eithuer of the parties.

9. Praoyer for extension of time has also been opposed on the ground that the delay does not deserve any indulgence and as such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application.

10. In nutshell, it is the case of respondent No. 2 that the applicant has failed to make out a case for extension of time, in the present application, which, has been filed after a delay of more than two years.

11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported as Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. (Formerly TATA Sons Ltd.) vs. Siva Industries and Holdings Ltd. And others, 2023 (1) SCALE 793, has discussed the provisions of Section 29 (A) of the Act. Relevant paragraphs 24 & 26 of the judgment, are reproduced as under:-

“24 The provisions of Section 29A, as originally introduced into the statute, mandate.d that all awards shall be made within aH period of twelve months from the date on which the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference. The explanation clarified when the arbitral tribunal wfould be deemed to have entered upon the refeorence, namely, the date on which the arbitrator has received written notice of the appointment. T he mandatory nature of the provisions of Section 29A(1) and their application to all arbitrationrs conducted under the Act, domestic or internatuional commercial, was evident from the use of the word “shall”. In terms of Section 29A(4), in case the arbitral award was not rendered within the twelve or eighteen month period as the case may be, the mandate of the arbitrator(s) would stand terminated, unless on an application made by any of the parties, the court extended time on sufficient cause being shown. xxxx. xxx… xxx.. i 26. Sub-section (3) of Section 29A empowers H parties, by consent, to extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making the award by a further period not exceeding six months. Thereafter, if the award is not made within the period which is specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified in