Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 29 of 2022, dated 10.10.2022, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as IPC) at Women Police Station, Solan, District Solan, H.P., based on the compromise.

2. It has been asserted that the informant does not want to pursue the matter because she has entered into a compromise with the accused voluntarily, without any influence from any person. Hence, the present petition.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the petitioner had maintained a sexual relationship with the victim. The police registered the F.I.R and investigated the matter. The police filed a charge sheet before the Court on 06.12.2022, after the completion of the investigation. The matter is pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Solan, H.P. Statements of three witnesses have been recorded, and now the matter is listed for prosecution evidence on 14.07.2026.

4. I have heard Mr Gurdev Negi, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

5. Mr Gurdev Negi, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner has entered into a compromise with the victim and she does not want to proceed further with the matter. No fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the criminal proceedings. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed based on the compromise effected between the parties.

6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC is heinous and cannot be quashed based on a compromise between the parties. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the jurisdiction of the Court to quash the FIR based on the compromise in Narender Singh versus State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466 and held that the heinous offences like murder, rape, etc, cannot be quashed based on a compromise effected between the parties. It was observed: -

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have settled, and on that basis, a petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power, the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, the offences alleged to have been committed under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences comm