Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

1. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 49 of 2024, dated 12.9.2024, registered at Police Station Kunihar, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 115(2) and 117(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR based on the compromise effected between the parties.

1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2. It has been asserted that the parties have entered into a compromise and influence from any person voluntarily. The challan is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Arki, District Solan, H.P. No fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the proceedings pendingf before the learned Trial Court. Hence the petition.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the recoruds carefully.

4. The ooffences punishable under Sections 115(1) and 117(2) of Cthe BNS are compoundable under Section 359 of Bharatiyan Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Therefore, the petitioner has a remedy of approaching the learned Trial Court to seek the composition of the offence.

5. It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent jurisdiction should not be exercised when a specific remedy exists. It was observed:

At the outset, the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:

“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) That it should be exercised ver.y sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.”

6. It was laid down by th e Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Gopal Dass vs State, AIR 1978 Del 138, that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is vested in the Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This jurisdiction cannot be exercised when a specific remedy is available under the other provisions of the Code. It was observed: -

“8. In order to determine the question under consideration as to what is the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it with the object of achieving the above said three results. It is for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers of the High PCourt, which are wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to afford relief to an aggrieved party. While exer.cising inherent powers, it has to be borne in mind tHhat this power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR 1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section 482, it was observed that a provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provisio