G. S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral)

The present appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge in OMP(M) No. 55 of 2024, titled as Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. vs. HCL Infotech Ltd., dated 10.10.2025.

The learned Single Judge has dismissed the application for condonation of delay, in filing the objections/petition under Section 34(1) & (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (for short ‘the Act’) which was against the award dated 15.03.2024, on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of 90 days but within the extended period of 120 days. The sufficient cause, which was made out by the appellant, was rejected and it was held that the file had been pending with the different authorities and not properly taken up with the Managing Director of the appellant’s organisation. Keeping in view the gravity of the matter and, therefore, the appellant could not show sufficient cause for the period of 22 days beyond the prescribed period of three months and it had also not been explained as to why the objections could not be preferred within the prescribed period of three months, the application was dismissed.

The learned Counsel for the appellant has referred to the order passed by us recently in Arb. Appeal No. 451 of 2025, titled as State of H.P. & Anr. vs. M/s Garg Sons Estate Promotors Pvt. Ltd., decided on 22.05.2026, wherein the issue as such of condoning the delaying while filing objection under Section 34 of the Act, was subject matter of consideration.

We had noticed that Section 34 of the Act is a substantive remedy to challenge the award and it is already limited in scope and it is imperative to interpret the limitation provisions liberally and there is only a limited window to challenge the arbitral award, which would be lost sight of and grave prejudice shall be caused to a party against whom an Award has been passed.

Various aspects regarding bureaucratic procedures which have been cited as ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay were taken into consideration while allowing the appeal of the State wherein also the delay was beyond the period of 90 days but within 120 days. The relevant portion of the order reads as under:-

“10. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to state that since the learned single judge has refused to condone the delay, in the case at hand, therefore in appeal, this Court would be entitled to consider if delay should be condoned or not afresh. In this respect, reference can gainfully be made to the Apex Court judgment in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 titled Shivamma (dead) By LRs. vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Others, decided on 12.09.2025. Relevant extract whereof reads as follows;

“It is no more res integra that where a court below refused to condone the delay, then the court sitting in appeal would be entitled to consider if delay should be condoned or not afresh, notwithstanding the decision of the lower court. However, some weight and importance would have to be given to the reasons which swayed the court below from refusing to exercise its discretion. Because refusal to condone the delay is also, nevertheless an exercise of discretion to not exercise discretion. However, the scope, available to the appellate court to substitute its findings in such scenarios would enjoy a considerable degree of play in its joints.”

11. The primary object of the Act as enunciated by the Apex Court in Icomm Tele Limited Vs. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Anr. (2019) 4 SCC 401 is to reach a final disposal of disputes in a speedy, effective, inexpensive and expeditious manner. In order to make the arbitration process more effective, the interference of the Courts has been specifically restricted. The relevant extract reads as follows:-

“25. Several judgments of this Court have also reiterated that the primary object of arbitration is to reach a final disposal of disputes in a speedy, effective, inexpensive and expeditious manner. Thus, in C