आयकर अपील(cid:547)य अ(cid:876)धकरण,चÖडीगढ़ Ûयायपीठ, चÖडीगढ़ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DIVISION BENCH, ‘B’ CHANDIGARH BEFORE SHRI RAJPAL YADAV, VICE PRESIDENT AND SHRI KRINWANT SAHAY, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER आयकर अपील सं./ ITA Nos. 992 & 993/CHD/2024 (cid:467)नधा(cid:91)रण वष(cid:91) / Assessment Years: 2017-18, 2016-17 The DCIT, Vs Malbros International Pvt. Ltd., Central Circle-2, Village – Mansoorwal, Teh-Zira, Ludhiana. Head Offices Old Cantt. Road, Faridkot.

èथायी लेखा सं./PAN NO: AADCM7203R अपीलाथ(cid:568)/Appellant (cid:292)×यथ(cid:568)/Respondent &

C.O. Nos. 46 & 45/CHD/2024 IN आयकर अपील सं./ ITA Nos. 992 & 993/CHD/2024 (cid:467)नधा(cid:91)रण वष(cid:91) / Assessment Year: 2017-18, 2016-17 Malbros International Pvt. Ltd., The DCIT, Village – Mansoorwal, Teh-Zira, Vs Central Circle-2, Head Offices Old Cantt. Road, Ludhiana.

Faridkot.

èथायी लेखा सं./PAN NO: AADCM7203R अपीलाथ(cid:568)/Appellant (cid:292)×यथ(cid:568)/Respondent Assessee by : Shri Sudhir Sehgal, Advocate Revenue by : Smt. Kusum Bansal, CIT DR Date of Hearing : 14.05.2025 Date of Pronouncement : 25.06.2025 HYBRID HEARING O R D E R PER RAJ PAL YADAV, VP The present two appeals are directed at the instance of Revenue against the separate orders of ld. CIT (Appeals)

dated 09.07.2024 passed for assessment year 2017-18 and

2016-17.

2. On receipt of notice, assessee has filed Cross Objections bearing Nos. 45/CHD/2024 and 46/CHD/2024 in assessment year 2016-17 and 2017-18.

3. The Registry has pointed out that both the Cross Objections are time barred by 26 days. The assessee has filed application for condonation of delay wherein it has been pleaded that earlier litigation was being held by Shri Varun Makhija, Tax Consultant, in whose opinion, no Cross Objection is to be filed because these are departmental appeals, however, when assessee contacted the Senior Counsel, then he opined to file Cross Objections challenging the re-opening of assessment. Accordingly, Cross Objections have been filed.

4. Sub-section 5 of Section 253 contemplates that the Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit filing of memorandum of cross- objections after expiry of relevant period, if it is satisfied that there was a sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. This expression sufficient cause employed in the section has also been used identically in sub- section 3 of section 249 of Income Tax Act, which provides powers to the ld. Commissioner to condone the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner. Similarly, it has been used in section 5 of Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Whenever interpretation and construction of this expression has fallen for consideration before Hon’ble High Court as well as before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, then, Hon’ble Court were unanimous in their conclusion that this expression is to be used liberally. We may make reference to the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme court from the decision in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji&

Others, 1987 AIR 1353:

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. "Every day’s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to