vk;dj vihyh; vf/kdj.k] t;iqj U;k;ihB] t;iqj IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR BENCHES,”SMC” JAIPUR Jherh vUukiw.kkZ xqIrk] ys[kk lnL; ds le{k BEFORE: SMT. ANNAPURNA GUPTA, AM vk;dj vihy la-@ITA No.1280/JPR/2025 fu/kZkj.k o"kZ@Assessment Years : 2020-21 fu/kZkj.k o"kZ@Assessment Years : 2020-21 fu/kZkj.k o"kZ@Assessment Years : 2020-21 fu/kZkj.k o"kZ@Assessment Years : 2020-21 fu/kZkj.k o"kZ@Assessment Years : 2020-21 fu/kZkj.k o"kZ@Assessment Years : 2020-21 fu/kZkj.k o"kZ@Assessment Years : 2020-21 fu/kZkfjrh dh vksj ls@ Assessee by : Sh. R.S. Poonia, CA jktLo dh vksj ls@ Revenue by : Sh. Gautam Singh Choudhary JCIT lquokbZ dh rkjh[k@ Date of Hearing : 18/12/2025 mn?kks"k.kk dh rkjh[k@Date of Pronouncement : 01/01/2026 vkns'k@ ORDER PER: ANNAPURNA GUPTA, AM The present appeal has been filed by the assessee against the order passed by the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), (ld. CIT(A)), Addl/JCIT (A)-1 Gurugram under Section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as “Act”).

2. The appeal has been noted to be time-barred by 476 days. The assessee has filed an application seeking condonation of delay. The contents of the application are substantiated in a duly sworn affidavit dated 18.12.2025 which was also filed before the Tribunal. Learned counsel for the assessee referred to the contents of the application while orally making out a case of there being sufficient cause for the delay and accordingly, requested condonation of the same. His contentions, primarily were to the effect, that the delay was not deliberate, there was sufficient cause for the delay and on merits since the assessee had a favourable case covered by various decisions of the co-ordinate Benches of ITAT, the delay needed to be condoned to sub-serve the interest of justice. That if the delay is not condoned the assessee’s meritorious matter would be thrown out and the cause of justice defeated. His contention was that as per the facts leading to delay the assessee fulfilled all the principles lay down by Judicial Authorities for condoning the delay. Reference was made to several decisions in this regard, which shall be referred to in the later part of the judgment.

3. Ld. DR, on the other hand, vehemently opposed the condonation of delay contending that the reason brought out by the assessee reflected laxity on his part in pursuing the remedy of filing appeal and therefore the delay ought not to be condoned.

4. I have heard both the parties and have gone through the contents of the application filed before me by the assessee along with the duly sworn affidavit explaining the reason for the delay in the filing of the present appeal before us by 476 days. The ld. CIT(A) had passed the order on 29.03.2024. The assessee was to file the appeal within 60 days of the receipt of the order; however, the present appeal was filed before the Tribunal on 19.09.2025 by a delay of 476.

5. Since the arguments made by both the sides before the Tribunal rest on the principles laid down by judicial authorities relating to condonation of delay it is pertinent to first bring out the principles enunciated by various judicial authorities for condonation of delay.

6. Beginning with the landmark decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Another Vs. M/s Katiji and Others 1988 SC 897(7), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the power of courts to condone delay conferred by Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act was primarily to enable courts to advance substantial justice to parties on merits. The Hon'ble Court noted that the expression “sufficient cause” employed by Legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act was technically elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which would sub-serve the ends of justice, noting that giving justice was the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. The principles noted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision for condona