, आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण हैदराबाद पीठ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL Hyderabad ‘B’ Bench, Hyderabad श्री रविश सूद , न् याययक सदस्य एव ं , श्री मिुसूदन सावडिया लेखा सदस्य के समक्ष ।

BEFORE SHRI RAVISH SOOD, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI MADHUSUDAN SAWDIA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER आ.अपी.सं /ITA No.575 to 578/Hyd/2025 (निर्धारण वर्ा/Assessment Years:2009-10, 2010-11 &

2013-14)

Shri Balreddy Gade, Addl. Commissioner of Income Tax, Hyderabad. Vs. Central Range-1, PAN:ADEPG7858D Hyderabad.

(Appellant) (Respondent)

निर्धाररती द्वधरध/Assessee by: Shri K C Devdas, C.A.

रधजस् व द्वधरध/Revenue by:: Dr. Narendra Kumar Naik, CIT-DR सुिवधई की तधरीख/Date of hearing: 07/08/2025 घोर्णध की तधरीख/Pronouncement: 28/08/2025 /ORDER आदेश PER BENCH :

These appeals are filed by Shri Balreddy Gade (“the assessee”), feeling aggrieved by the separate orders passed by the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-12, Hyderabad (“Ld. CIT(A)”), all dated 13.03.2025 for the A.Ys. 2009-10, 2010- 11 & 2013-14 respectively. Since these appeals are related to the same assessee and issues are identical in nature, they are heard together and one consolidated order is being passed for the sake of convenience and brevity.

2. We take up ITA No.575/Hyd/2025 as lead appeal and the grounds raised in the appeal are as under :

1. That the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-12, Hyderabad [‘CIT(A)’] has erred in law and on facts in upholding the penalty of ₹43,69,500/- levied under Section 271D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), without appreciating that the said amount was already assessed as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Act, thereby losing its character as a ‘loan’ or ‘deposit’ within the meaning of Section 269SS, making the imposition of penalty under Section 271D legally unsustainable.

2. That the learned CIT(A) has failed to appreciate that once the amount in question has been treated as the appellant’s own income under Section 68 of the Act, it ceases to be a ‘loan’ or ‘deposit’ received from a third party, thereby rendering Section 269SS inapplicable, as upheld by various judicial precedents.

3. That the learned CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the penalty under Section 271D without considering that the learned Assessing Officer (‘AO’) has also initiated penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act for alleged concealment of income on the same amount, thereby subjecting the appellant to double jeopardy, which is contrary to settled legal principles and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice.

4. That the learned CIT(A) has failed to appreciate that the cash transactions were incorporated in the memorandum books of accounts solely based on the seized and impounded materials obtained during the search and seizure operation under Section 132 and the survey operation under Section 133A of the Act, and as such, the same constitutes admissible evidence, which cannot be selectively relied upon by the department for penalizing the appellant.

5. That the learned CIT(A) has failed to appreciate that once the revenue has treated the seized materials as reliable evidence for making an addition under Section 68, the same documents must be considered in totality, and the department cannot approbate and reprobate by selectively disregarding the appellant’s reliance on the same materials while imposing a penalty under Section 271D, as per the settled judicial principles.

6. That the learned CIT(A) has erred in confirming the penalty under Section 271D in a mechanical manner, without appreciating that the memorandum books of accounts were not voluntarily maintained by the appellant in the normal course of business, but were prepared solely under the direction of the department based on the seized and impounded materials, and therefore, cannot be used against the appellant for penal purposes.

7. That the learned CIT(A) has failed to appreciate that the burden of proving that the transactions recorded in the memorandum books we