IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL “SMC” BENCH MUMBAI BEFORE HON’BLE SHRI SANDEEP GOSAIN, JUDICIAL MEMBER (Assessment Year: 2018-19)

Attivo Protezione Pvt Ltd Vs. ITO, Ward – 22(1)(1)

108, 1st Floor Ashar Enclave Room No. 319, Piramal Kolshet Road, Thane – 400 Chambers, Mumbai

607.

PAN/GIR No. AALCA4330M (Applicant) (Respondent)

Assessee by None Revenue by Shri Rajesh Sakhardane, Sr. DR Date of Hearing 27.10.2025 Date of Pronouncement 31.10.2025 आदेश / ORDER PER SANDEEP GOSAIN, JM:

The present appeal has been filed by the assessee challenging the impugned order dt. 29.09.2021 passed under section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), by the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) / CIT(A) for the assessment year 2018-19.

2. None appeared on behalf of the assessee either physically or virtually when the case was called repeatedly, however an application for seeking adjournment is on the court file. After having gone through the contents of the said application I find no reasons for further adjournment as the assessee was required to file affidavit along with the application for seeking condonation of delay of 1370 days in filing the appeal, the said affidavit was required to be filed but the same was not filed on 29.08.2025 when the appeal was filed. Thus for this purpose alone no further adjournment can be granted. Even otherwise adjournment is not a right of the party but is discretion of the court therefore application for seeking adjournment stands rejected.

3. Ld. DR present in the court is ready with the arguments, therefore I decided to proceed with the hearing of the appeal ex-parte.

4. Since there is a delay in filing the present appeal of 1370 days and in this regard assessee has only mentioned that after the decision of the appeal by Ld. CIT(A), the Tax consultant of the assessee had not advised any remedial action against the said order passed u/s 250 of the Act, therefore appeal was not filed.

5. To my mind this cannot be a reason for condoning the delay of 1370 days. After having examine the issue in the light of the facts and the circumstances of the case and also in view of the terms of section 5 of the Limitation Act, whereby discretion is vested in the Court/Appellate Authority to admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows ‘sufficient cause' for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. The expression 'sufficient cause’ commonly appears in the provisions of order 22 Rule 9 (2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence which would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5. “Sufficient cause” is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. Courts have time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. The law of Limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim “'Interest ReipublicaeUt Sit Finis Litium” (It is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation).

6 To understand the scope of the term “sufficient cause” in matters of delay, reliance is placed on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Ors vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the sufficient cause does not include the negligent manner in which the applicant had acted or/ and there was a want of bona fide, on his/her part. If a party does not act diligently or remains inactive, it cannot qualify as sufficient ground allowing the court to exercise discretion in favour of such a party. Condonation of delay is not an automatic right but requires the person requesting it to provide a valid explanation for each day of dela