आदेश /O R D E R

PER S.S. VISWANETHRA RAVI, JUDICIAL MEMBER:

This appeal filed by the assessee is directed against the order dated 21.01.2026 passed by the ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), ADDL/JCIT (A)-2, Ahmedabad, for the assessment year 2021-22.

2. We find that this appeal was filed before the ld. CIT(A) against the intimation dated 25.10.2022 passed under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act’) denying exemption under Section 80(P)(2)(a)(i) &(d) of the Act with a delay of 880 days. The assessee filed a delay condonation petition, which is reproduced in para 6.2 of the impugned order. The assessee primarily contended that the Secretary of the assessee was not well-acquainted with computer knowledge and faceless proceedings, and therefore the Secretary was not in the knowledge of the passing of the order by the CPC on 25.10.2022. The ld. CIT(A) held that the said explanation is not acceptable as the assessee is a registered cooperative society having a statutory obligation to comply with electronic filing and communication under the Act and faceless proceedings were uniformly applicable and well-established during the relevant period. Further, he observed that the intimation passed by the CPC was duly generated and communicated through the Income Tax Department portal and registered email. We find that no evidence has been produced to show denial of receipt of notice through the Income Tax Department portal and registered email; therefore, mere statement of administrative lapse and lack of computer knowledge cannot constitute sufficient cause. Therefore, we find no infirmity in the order of the ld. CIT(A) in rejecting the delay condonation petition, and we are in complete agreement with the reasons recorded by the ld. CIT(A) in page No. 7 of the impugned order.

3. We find time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Guruswamy & ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah in Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2025, dated 08.01.2025 has reminded that the concept of “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. Further, reasons must satisfy the authorities that the assessee was prevented by any sufficient cause, unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the authorities should not allow the petition for condonation of delay, in case the petition for condonation is allowed in condoning the delay without any justification, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to legislature. Having keeping in mind, we find in the present case, the length of delay is definitely a relevant matter that this Tribunal must take into consideration while considering the reasons explained in the delay condonation petition. It is an established principle where an appeal presented with abnormal delay, beyond limitation, the assessee has to explain as to what is the reasonable cause, which really prevented the assessee to approach the appellate authority within time. As we discussed above, since the assessee failed to give sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time before ld. CIT(A), we hold that the assessee’s reasons for the inordinate delay cannot be interpreted liberally, we, therefore, find no infirmity in the order of ld. CIT(A) in rejecting the condonation petition filed by the assessee for the delay of 880 days in filing the appeal before the ld. CIT(A). Accordingly, the grounds raised by the assessee are dismissed.

4. In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.