Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act is prospective in nature and applies to offenses committed after its enactment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Cr. M. P. No. 836 of 2021

Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava

.... .. ... Petitioner(s)

Versus

1.State of Jharkhand

2.Prabhash Chandra

.. ... ...Opp. Party(s)

...........

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY

.........

For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Mukesh Kumar, Advocate

For the State

: Mr. S. K. Tiwari, APP

For the O.P. No.2

: Mr. Vikash Kumar, Advocate

…...

10/ 03.01.2023.

1. The instant Cr. M. P. has been filed for quashing the order dated 10.03.2021 passed

by learned Sessions Judge, Bokaro in Criminal Revision No.117 of 2020 whereby

and whereunder the order of interim compensation of Rs.10 Lakhs passed under

Section 143A of N. I. Act ( in connection with C. P. Case No.1103 of 2018) has been

affirmed.

2. The said order has been challenged on the ground that Section 143A of the N.I. Act

was inserted by amendment with effect from 01.09.2018 whereas the cheque was

dishonoured on 08.08.2018 and, therefore, the provision under the said Act will have

no application since Section 143A of the N.I. Act is prospective of its operation.

Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission has relied upon the

following authorities :-

I.

G. J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 469 wherein it

has been held that Section 143A of the N. I. Act is prospective in nature.

II.

Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., reported

in (2014) 9 SCC 129 at Paras 36 & 40.

III.

Harman Electronics Private Limited and Anr. vs. National Panasonic

Indian Private Limited, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 720

3. It has not been disputed by learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant/O.P.

No.2 that Section 143A of the N. I. Act is prospective in nature. The offence will be

committed on the date when the cheque was drawn and when the steps as provided

under the proviso of Section 138 N. I. Act is complete.

4. It is submitted that in the instant case the cheque was issued on 06.08.2018 and

presented in the Bank on the same day and was dishonoured on 08.08.2018. The

notice with regard to it was sent to the accused on 05.09.2018 which was not

accepted and the payment was also not made. Consequently, the complaint was filed

on 03.10.2018. Therefore, the offence was completed after the insertion of Section

143A of the N. I. Act which came into force on 01.09.2018.

5. The short question that falls for consideration is when is the offence under

Section 138 is said to be complete?

6. The question has been answered in Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey,

(2014) 10 SCC 713:

No offence can be said to have been committed unless and until the period

of 15 days, as prescribed under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, has, in

fact, elapsed. Therefore, a court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such

complaint. It is not open to the court to take cognizance of such a complaint

merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period

of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the

drawer/accused has elapsed.

From the above, it is apparent that the offence was complete not on

8.8.2018 the date when the cheque was dishonoured, but 15 days after the notice

which was sent on 5.9.2018 and was accepted. On the date of completion of

offence, Section 143 A of the N.I. Act had come into force. Therefore the plea that

the provision had not come into force is not tenable and fit to be rejected.

I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order.

The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition accordingly stands dismissed.

(Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J.)

Sandeep/