An employee cannot be dismissed from service for an offence that is compoundable and does not involve moral turpitude, and if the employee is acquitted in the criminal case based on a compromise, the acquittal amounts to a clean acquittal and the employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

W.P(S) No. 2839 of 2021

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Bikram Prasad

…. …. Petitioner(s).

Versus

1. Central Bank of India through its Zonal Manager, Patna Zonal Office,

Block-B, 2^nd Floor, Mauryalok Complex, Dak Bunglow Road, Patna

2. Senior Regional Manager-cum-Assistant General Manager-cum-

Disciplinary Authority, Central Bank of India at Krishna Arcade, 2^nd Floor,

Bootymore, Ranchi

3. Chief Manager, Central Bank of India, Ranchi

4. Branch Manager, Telco Branch, Central Bank of India, Jamshedpur, East

Singhbhum

…. …. Respondent(s)

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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANANDA SEN.

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For the Petitioner(S) : Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate

For the Respondent

: Mr. P.A.S. Pati, Advocate

06/11.01.2023

Heard the parties.

2.

In this writ application, petitioner has prayed to quash the order dated

24.3.2021 as contained in Memo No. 242 whereby the Disciplinary Authority

reconsidered the punishment, which was earlier inflicted and substituted the

same by compulsory retirement. A prayer has also been made to quash the

punishment order. Further a prayer has been made to reinstate the petitioner

with back wages.

3.

The petitioner was appointed as Daftari in Central Bank of India,

Jamshedpur Branch on 31.3.1989. In the year 2004 a complaint was filed being

Complaint Case No. 607 of 2004 against the petitioner under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instrument Act. The complainant was one Amar Bahadur Thapa.

This petitioner was convicted and was directed to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for eight months. He was also directed to pay an amount of

Rs.1,20,000/- to the complainant. Against the aforesaid order of conviction the

petitioner filed a criminal appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 208 of 2006. As

the petitioner was convicted, a Departmental Proceeding was initiated against

him. A show-cause notice was issued vide Memo No. 91 dated 30.8.2006

alleging that the action of the petitioner involves “Moral Turpitude”.

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The Disciplinary Authority on 26.10.2006 vide Memo No. 121, considering the

conviction, dismissed the petitioner from service. The petitioner preferred a

Departmental Appeal against the order of conviction. In the meantime the

petitioner entered into compromise with the complainant of the criminal case.

The said compromise was brought to the notice of Appellate Court in Criminal

Appeal No. 208 of 2006 and vide order dated 15.5.2007 the Appellate Court

acquitted the petitioner. The Appellate Authority without considering the

compromise and the acquittal, rejected the appeal of the petitioner against which

the petitioner approached this Court in W.P(S) No. 4547 of 2008. This Hon’ble

Court disposed of the writ application after setting aside the order of punishment

of dismissal and remitted the matter back to the bank with a direction to pass a

fresh order in the light of the discussions made in the writ application. After the

remand, the respondents-bank passed the impugned order converting the order

of dismissal into punishment of Compulsory Retirement with superannuation

benefits. The aforesaid order is under challenge.

4.

Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that admittedly

the petitioner was inflicted with punishment only on the ground of his

conviction. When the conviction order has been set aside and the petitioner has

been acquitted, the Disciplinary Authority could not have passed the impugned

order. As per him the initial conviction was under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instrument Act, filed by a private person. This act of dishonour of cheque

cannot come within the purview of “moral turpitude”. Further when

compromise petition was filed and court has accepted the compromise petition

and thereafter acquitted the petitioner, the respondents could not have punished

the peititoner. After setting aside of the order of conviction, the grounds for

dismissal does not remain and the only