IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr.M.P. No.3015 of 2023 ------

Umesh @ Umesh Singh, aged about 58 years, Son of Chandeshwar Singh, Resident of 1B, Silver Valley, Shree Ram Nagar, Toto Bari, Kokar, Post Office Kokar, Police Station- Sadar Ranchi, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.

… Petitioner Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand

2. Showmic Maji, Son of Subodh Kumar Maji, Resident of 18-C, Radha Govind Street, Tharpakhna, Post Office and Police Station- Lalpur, Ranchi, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.

… Opposite Parties ------

For the Petitioner : Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate Mr. Jagdeesh, Advocate For the State : Mr. Manoj Kr. Mishra, Addl.P.P.

For the OP No.2 : Ms. Debopriya Pal, Advocate Mr. Navneet Kr. Dhar, Advocate ------

P R E S E N T HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY By the Court:- Heard the parties.

2. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the prayer to quash the order dated 30.11.2022 passed in Complaint Case No. 9551 of 2021 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi whereby and where under the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi has allowed the petition under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act filed by the opposite party No.2 and directed the petitioner-who is the accused person of the case, to make the payment of 20 per cent of the cheque amount i.e. Rs.1,00,000/- as interim compensation.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another reported in 2024 INSC 205, para-22 to 24 of which reads as under:-

“22. When the court deals with an application under Section 143-A of the NI Act, the court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under sub-section (1) of Section 143-A. The presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation. The reason is that the presumption is rebuttable. The question of applying the presumption will arise at the trial. Only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case, a direction can be issued to pay interim compensation. At this stage, the fact that the accused is in financial distress can also be a consideration.

23. Even if the court concludes that a case is made out for grant of interim compensation, the court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. Even at this stage, the court will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant and the paying capacity of the accused. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation.

24 We may note that the factors required to be considered, which we have set out above, are not exhaustive. There could be several other factors in the facts of a given case, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143-A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant factors.”

(Emphasis supplied)

and submits that the learned Judicial Magistrate was under the erroneous impression that for grant of interim compensation under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, only two requirements; i.e. firstly, there should be a summary/summons trial case and secondly, the substance of acquisition in a complaint explained for charge should have been framed and it was also under the erroneous impression that the aid of the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be taken for the purpose of passing an order under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits th