JUDGMENT :

DEEPAK ROSHAN, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition seeking for quashment of Order No.1346 dated 04/06.11.2017, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from his services on account of his conviction under Section 498-A IPC. Brief Facts

3. The writ petitioner was employed in Bharat Coking Coal Limited and was posted at Block-IV Colliery as an EP Mazdoor. While in service, he was convicted in C.P. Case No.2027 of 2009, corresponding to T.R. No.158 of 2017, by a judgment dated 21st of July 2017 for an offence under Section 498-A of IPC. His conviction was affirmed in appeal and presently a revision application is pending.

4. Under Clause 26.1.19 of the Certified Standing Orders, a conviction for offence involving moral turpitude is a serious misconduct warranting dismissal from service. When such judgment of conviction was brought to the notice of the Management, show-cause notice was issued to the writ petitioner on 13.10.2017 directing the writ petitioner to show cause as to why his services be not terminated on account of his conviction for an offence under Section 498-A of IPC in terms of Clause 26.1.19 of the Certified Standing Orders. The writ petitioner submitted his reply (Annexure 3) which was duly considered and he was ultimately discharged from service by an order dated 04/06.11.2017. The dismissal order has been challenged by the writ petitioner in the instant writ petition.

5. The respondents have filed a detailed counter affidavit explaining therein that Section 498-A of IPC is an offence involving moral turpitude and in view of his conviction, the writ petitioner cannot continue in service more particularly in view of Clause 26.1.19 of the Certified Standing Orders and accordingly, he has been rightly terminated.

6. The writ petitioner has mainly argued that the offence under section 498A of IPC do not involve moral turpitude and relied upon a judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the matter of Sarju Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar and Others, 1987 PLJR 285 (FB), wherein the Patna High Court in paragraphs 12 and 13 has held as under:-

“11. Indeed, herein we are concerned with the charge of murder in its true legal sense. When Rule 100 talks of a criminal charge, it is not an abstract, but in the concrete form of a pending proceeding or allegation levelling such a criminal charge. Inevitably, one has to turn to the relevant provisions of Sections 299 and 300 and of Section 302, providing the punishment for murder Contained in Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code, pertaining to the offences affecting human body. The line of distinction that divides culpable homicide from the ultimate offence of murder is somewhat thin and a matter of deep intricacy, into which it is unnecessary to delve and be bogged down in the present case. It suffices to mention that the true concept of murder, as spelt out by the Code is a matter of some complexity. Section 299 first defines what is culpable, homicide, with three illustrations and three explanations thereto. The succeeding Section 300 then spells out the aggravated forms of culpable homicide, which would amount to murder. These are precisely laid out in Clauses (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Section 300. Out of these, five exceptions are then carved out, which would again take the offence out of the ambit of murder, and reduce them to only culpable homicide. These are then detailed in exceptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to Section 300. It is against this context that a change of murder has to be viewed and construed. When in legal terms one talks of a murder charge, then what is precisely indicated is that the offence comes squarely within the four clauses of Section 300, and, further that it is not excluded therefrom by coming within any of the five exceptions thereto. It is only in this sense alone that a criminal charge of murder is to be understood as the ultimate crime against the human body by extinguishing