The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings can be invoked to prevent abuse of process, but it is limited at interlocutory stages to maintain the integrity of criminal trials.

1.This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against Judgment of single Judge dated June 3, 1999, whereby petition for quashing Government Order Nos. 11 - GR - Home (Vig) / 90 and 12 - GR - HOME (Vig) / 90, dated May 05, 1990, sanctioning prosecution of petitioners has been dismissed.

2. Briefly stated, Mohammad Muzaffer Hamdani was General Manager, Ghulam Mohammad Sofi, Manager and Mohammad Maqbool Hakim, Industrial Promotion Officer, DIC, Srinagar. They processed claims for refund of Central Sales Tax, ultimately sanctioned by District Development Commissioner, Srinagar. Petitioners submit that they did so in the discharge of their normal duties honestly and diligently, a fact substantiated by Committee appointed by District Development Commissioner to examine whether the claims for refund were justified. With this background, no offence has been committed by them, therefore, initiation of criminal case is vexatious and without evidence. This apart, before sanction is accorded, matter is required to be sent to the Chief Minister. This having not been done, the sanction is bad. Even otherwise, it is result of non - application of mind by the Competent Authority. Before answering these submissions, it would be appropriate to mention certain decisions of Apex Court with reference to the jurisdiction of this Court with respect to quashing of criminal proceedings, particularly at the initial stages.

3. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab , AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 CriLJ 1239, the Apex Court said in para 6 that :
"6. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under S. 561 - A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the magistrate before whom police report has been filed under S. 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceedings in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceedin