J U D G M E N T (ORAL)

1. By this judgment, we propose to dispose of the appeal as well as the writ petition as both the matters involve similar issues.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the compensation being claimed by the appellants/petitioners is above Rs. fifty lakhs and, therefore, the State Commission has disallowed the complaints only on the ground that they are non-maintainable due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction.

3. The Commission has admittedly not gone into the merits of the case and, therefore, the petitioners/appellants have not touched upon the merits of the case but have addressed the Court on the limited count that the case of “Met Life India Insurance Company Ltd & Another v. Abdul Aziz Khan” passed in FAO(D) No. 01/2025 which has been relied upon by the J&K State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Srinagar is actually not applicable in the present case because, in the judgment of Met life supra, the mandate issued by the Court was not to bracket the pecuniary jurisdiction but was on a totally different count.

4. The distinction between the ratio decidendi and the obiter dicta has not been appreciated by the learned Commission. The counsel for the appellants/petitioners submits that once “MetLife India Insurance Company Ltd.” is not applicable, then the analogy of the whole case, particularly for deciding the issue of pecuniary jurisdiction, which is the sole ground of dismissal and passing of the impugned orders, has to be seen.

5. The counsel for the petitioners/appellants has thus taken this Court to the initiation of the issue, which started from the Basic Act of 1987. In the Basic Act of 1987, which is the Jammu and Kashmir Consumer Protection Act, 1987, Section 15 provided for a pecuniary limit which was initially Rupees fifty thousand to Rupees ten lakhs.

6. The counsel for the petitioners thereafter has drawn attention of this Court to the amendment which came in 1997, whereby the words “rupees fifty thousand” were substituted by “rupees five lakhs” and the words “rupees ten lakhs” were substituted by “rupees thirty lakhs”.

7. The counsel for the petitioners thereafter has drawn attention of this Court to the Gazette notification of 1998, whereby the words “rupees thirty lakhs” have been omitted. The counsel submits that the omission of “rupees thirty lakhs” amounted to removing the upper cap of the pecuniary jurisdiction, resulting in remedies for claims above Rs. fifty lakhs being available before the State Commission.

8. The counsel further submitted that until 2019, when the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, became applicable after the repeal of the 1987 Act, the disputes which had arisen ought to have been decided by treating the upper limit as unlimited for the purpose of the State Commission because, once the National Commission was not applicable, then a person would be rendered remediless in case the claim exceeded Rs. fifty lakhs. The counsel has also shown the substitution made in 2011, which took the upper limit to Rs. fifty lakhs, without discussing the removal of the upper limit. This is because substitution could have happened only if there was an existing upper limit of Rs. fifty lakhs, whereas the notification of 1998 had removed the upper limit and, thus, the substitution itself was non-est at the threshold.

9. The counsel further submitted that, for all those cases which had arisen before the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 came into effect, a person would be rendered remediless if seeking compensation exceeds Rs. fifty lakhs, as there was no remedy either under the 1987 Act or under any of the amendments that had been made.

10. Learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners submits that it is a settled law that a person cannot be rendered remediless for the purpose of enforcing his rights.

11. The counsel for the petitioners/appellants further submit that, in case the issue is not settled, the case will have to be re-initiated from t