ORAL ORDER

The learned High Court Government Pleader accepts notice for the respondent No.1.

2. The petitioners - accused Nos.3, 4 and 6, who have been charge sheeted for the offices punishable under Sections 120(B), 417, 420, 419, 471, 465, 468, 109 read with Section 34, 37 of IPC, are before this Court seeking relief.

3. The case of the prosecution is that during the selection process for the post of Special Reserve Police Constable, accused No.2 had applied for the said post. Allegedly, accused No.1 participated in the written examination. The specific allegation against accused Nos.3, 4 and 6 is that they created a fake aadhar card of accused No.2. The petitioners - accused Nos.3, 4 and 6 have been implicated solely on the basis of voluntary confession statement of accused Nos.1 and 2, wherein they have stated that they were introduced by accused Nos.3, 4 and 6 and edited the adhar card of accused No.2.

4. In the present case, the allegation against accused Nos.3, 4 and 6, even if it is taken on the face of it does not fulfill the essential elements required to constitute the offences as alleged against them. The prosecution has failed to produce any corroborative material to substantiate the claims made in the voluntary statements of accused Nos.1 and 2.

5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, [(2018) 8 SCC 271], has held as follows:

“It would be noticed that, as a result of the provisions contained in Section 30, the confession has no general evidentiary value, because whatever is considered by the court as evidence, including circumstances and probabilities, must meet the definition of evidence under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act. While a confession may be considered as evidence in a broad sense due to Section 30, it is not evidence as defined under Section 3 of the Act. As such, in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot rely solely on the confession of a co-accused. Instead, it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and, after forming its opinion on the quality and effect of such evidence, may refer to the confession for assurance in reaching a conclusion of guilt. That is the effect of Section 30. This view has also been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. [1952 SCR 526: AIR 1952 SC 159: 1952 Cri LJ 839], wherein the Privy Council decision in Bhuboni Sahu v. R. [1949 SCC OnLine PC 12: (1948-49) 76 IA 147]

was cited with approval.”

6. It is a well-settled principle that any confession made by an accused while in police custody is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, unless corroborated by material evidence substantiating the allegations against the accused. Furthermore, an accused cannot be subjected to trial solely on the basis of a confession statement of co-accused.

7. In the present case, the allegation against accused Nos.3, 4 and 6, even if taken at face value, does not fulfill the essential elements required to constitute the offences as alleged against him. The prosecution has failed to produce any corroborative material to substantiate the claims made in the voluntary statements of accused Nos.

1 and 2.

8. Therefore, in the absence of any corroborative evidence, the continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners solely based on the inadmissible confession statement of accused Nos.1 and 2 would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

9. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned proceedings in CC No.10885/2023 pending on the file of the learned I ACMM Court, Bengaluru, insofar it relates to the petitioners - accused Nos.3, 4 and 6 is hereby quashed.

10. The respondent No.1 is at liberty to investigate into the alleged offence against the other accused.