For an offense under SC/ST Act to stand, the abuse must occur in a public view, with evidence proving caste-based discrimination.

ORDER

1. The petitioners are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:

i. Quash the FIR in Cr.No.220/2017 filed by the First Respondent Doddaballapur Rural Police Station u/s 427, 506, 34, 447 of IPC and 3(1)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act on the file of the Hon’ble II Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural District at Bangalore.

2. Respondent No.2 had filed a first information which came to be registered as Crime No.220/2017 on 07.03.2010 at 16.10 hours alleging that the petitioners and certain others had abused respondent No.2 by making use of his caste when he made enquiries as to alleged trespass made by the petitioners into his property. It is in that background that the aforesaid Crime No.220/2017 was registered for the offences under Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Attrocities) Act, 1989 and Section 427 , 506, 447 read with Section 34 of IPC.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that there is no such incident which has occurred. The petitioners being the owner of the land in question and running Goshala in the name and style of Rashtrothana Parishat, the respondents are seeking to trespass on the land of the petitioners and in that background a false complaint has been filed.

4. Even as per the allegations of the petitioners in the complaint incident occurred on 07.03.2017 at 4.00 p.m. However, the complaint was lodged only on 09.06.2017 after a period of three months. If the allegations made by the respondent No.2 is accepted that the incident is stated to have occurred in the lands claimed by the respondent to be the owner and not in a public place, there is no allegation that any member of the public was present and in this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarkhand and another1 more particularly Paras 14, 15 and 22 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under:

“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it