An aggrieved party can file a criminal complaint for forgery even if the alleged forgery is related to a document used in court proceedings, as the bar under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. does not apply.

1. The petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:

a. To quash the order dated 26.09.2017 passed by the Court of the Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC, Thirthahalli, taking cognizance against the petitioners herein for the offences punishable under section 420, 419, 423, 415, 417, 465, 471 and 468 of IPC and issuing summons to the petitioners herein by registering the case in CC.No.780/2017, in the interest of justice and equity.

b. To quash the entire proceedings in CC.No.780/2017 on the file of by the Court of the Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC, Thirthahalli, in the interest of justice and equity.

c. To pass such other orders/directions deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity.

2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of cognizance dated 26.09.2017 taken in C.C.No.780/2017 for the offences punishable under Section 420 , 419, 423, 415, 417, 465 , 471 and 468 of IPC and in that background, the aforesaid reliefs have been sought for.

3. The submission of Sri.Sanket M.Yenagi, learned counsel for the petitioner is that;

3.1. On a document which is alleged to have been forged has been forged outside the Court and allegedly made use of in a suit in O.S.No.209/2015 and as such, in terms of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C., it is only the Court before which the alleged document has been produced who can initiate proceedings against the petitioner and not the complainant.

3.2. Secondly, he submits that the complainant has no locus inasmuch as the property which has been claimed by the complainant is Site No.4 whereas the property as regards which the alleged forgery has occurred is Site No.6 and the same does not relate to the property of the complainant and therefore, there is no locus to file a complaint as done since the complainant cannot be said to be aggrieved by any such forgery.

3.3. Lastly, he submits that the suit in O.S.No.209/2015 itself has been withdrawn. Hence, the question of any proceedings being initiated for alleged forgery would not arise.

The petitioner has not derived any benefit from the alleged forgery. No interim order was passed in O.S.No.209/2015 nor any final order is passed. The petitioner is not deriving any benefit. The allegation of an offence of forgery cannot be made against him.

3.4. Mr.Sanket M.Yenagi, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Surjit Singh and Others v. Balbir Singh 1 more particularly Para 8 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-

1 (1996) 3 SCC 533 8. In Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana the question was when a copy of the original document is produced and a private complaint is laid on the basis of a copy of the forged agreement, whether bar of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) gets attracted. This Court had held that until the original document is produced in the court, there is no bar of Section 195 and that, therefore, the private complaint was held not barred.

3.5. The decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy 2 more particularly Para 5 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-

5. If Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is attracted to the facts of the present case, in the absence of a complaint in writing of the civil court where the alleged forged receipt has been produced, taking of cognizance of the offence would be bad in law and the prosecution being not maintainable, there would be absolutely no justification to harass the appellants by allowing prosecution to have a full dressed trial. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) uses two different expressions: in regard to Section 463 of the Penal Code, 1860 it says, “offence described”, while in regard to Sections 471 and 475 or 476 IPC it says, “punishable”. The High Court has not made any reference to Section 471 IPC while rejecting the submissions of the appellants apparently because Section 471 in terms has been mentioned in the provision. So far as Section 463 is