ORDER

The captioned writ petition is filed by the purchaser, feeling aggrieved by the order passed by respondent No.2/Assistant Commissioner, who has ordered restoration of petition land on the premises that the land in question is a granted land, and the said order is confirmed by respondent No.1/Deputy Commissioner.

2. The impugned orders are liable to be quashed on two counts. On perusal of Annexure-B, it is squarely evident that the ancestor of respondents No.3 to 6 participated in a public auction and purchased the petition land in an auction. On perusal of Form No.1 issued by the authority, which is a grant certificate, which is issued in terms of Appendix-E to the Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1888, it is clearly evident that though it is styled as a grant certificate, the same has to be treated as a title document. The fact that the authority has issued Form No.1 clearly leads to an inference that it is not a grant in favour of the depressed class. The issue in regard to the grant certificate issued under Form No.1 is no more resintegra. The Apex Court in the case of B.K.Muniraju .vs. State of Karnataka1 has held as under;

"The document in question has been styled as "certificate of grant". In order to know the real nature of the document, one has to look into the recitals of the document and not the title of the document. The intention is to be gathered from recitals in the deed, conduct of the parties and evidence on record. It is settled law that question of construction of a document is to be decided by finding out intention of the executant, firstly, from a comprehensive reading of the terms of the document itself, and then, by looking into, to the extent permissible, the prevailing circumstances which persuaded the author of the document to execute it. With a view to ascertain the nature of a transaction, the document has to be read as a whole. A sentence or term used may not be determinative of real nature of transaction."

1 (2008) 4 SCC 451

3. The law laid down by the Apex Court is squarely applicable to the present case on hand. Respondent No.2/Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to order for restoration as the petition land is not a granted land as defined under Section 3(e) of the PTCL Act, 1978 (for short, 'Act'). Therefore, I am of the view that the order of restoration passed by respondent No.2/Assistant Commissioner is one without jurisdiction. Respondent No.2/Assistant Commissioner could not have invoked the provisions of the Act and should not have exercised the power/authority conferred on him under the provisions of the Act.

4. These relevant aspects are not dealt by Respondent No.1/Deputy Commissioner and respondent No.2/Assistant Commissioner. Respondent No.1/Deputy Commissioner and respondent No.2/Assistant Commissioner, being quasi-judicial authorities, have not taken pain to examine the nature of grant, and therefore, the order of restoration not only amounts to abuse of process but has lead to a miscarriage of justice as bonafide purchaser's valuable rights are taken away by way of summary proceedings. Respondent No2/Assistant Commissioner had no authority to annul the sale deeds.

5. Even on the ground of delay, the restoration petition is liable to be rejected as there is delay of 8 years. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi .vs. State of Karnataka and another2 and Vivek M. Hinduja .vs. M. Aswatha3 are squarely applicable to the present case on hand. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cited judgment has held that where statute does not provide for limitation, the authorities and State must act consciously and if the process of invoking the provisions of statute is delayed and is initiated after long lapse of time, the delay by itself would act as an impediment. Thus, without exception and coming across various rules of law, the Apex Court has categorically stated the law in respect of exercise of

2 (2020) 14 SCC 232

3 (2019) 1 Kant LJ 819 SC

power/jurisdiction