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2024 Supreme(Online)(Kar) 36503

KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
MR N. V. ANJARIA, CJ, MR JUSTICE K V ARAVIND, J
UNION OF INDIA – Appellant
Versus
SOUTH INDIAN SUGAR MILLS ASSOCIATION KARNATAKA (SISMA K) – Respondent
WA 1405 / 2024



SRI. K. ARVIND KAMATH, ASGI A/W SRI AJAY PRABHU M., ADVOCATE; SRI UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/W SRI MOHAN KUMARA B.M., ADVOCATE; SRI ABHRAJIT MITRA, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/W SRI SHRAVAN S. LOKRE, ADVOCATE; SRI DHYAN CHINNAPPA, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/W SRI GAUTAM SHAH AND MS. SANJANA DUA, ADVOCATES

Interim relief cannot grant principal relief; judicial review of policy decisions is limited.

Headnote:(A) Jute Packaging Materials (Compulsory Use in Packing Commodities) Act, 1987 - Sections 3 and 4 - Challenge to interim order staying Notifications regarding jute packaging for sugar - The Notifications mandated 100% food grains and 20% sugar to be packed in jute bags - The court examined whether the interim order had traits of finality and if the learned Single Judge erred in granting such relief. (Paras 2.1, 2.4, 5.7)

(B) Judicial Review - The scope of judicial review in policy matters is limited, and interim orders should not grant principal relief. The court emphasized that interim relief cannot amount to granting the main relief sought in the petition. (Paras 10.1, 10.3)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner challenged the validity of Notifications requiring sugar to be packed in jute bags, arguing that the Notifications ignored expert recommendations and posed health risks. The learned Single Judge stayed the Notifications, leading to the appeal.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the learned Single Judge erred in granting interim relief that effectively amounted to the main relief sought, and the Notifications were issued following statutory procedures.

Issues: The main issues were whether the interim order had traits of finality and if the learned Single Judge exceeded the parameters of judicial review.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the interim order was unsustainable as it granted principal relief and that the Notifications were validly issued under the JPM Act, emphasizing the limited scope of judicial review in policy matters.

Result: The order dated 5th September 2024 is set aside; the appeal is allowed.

ORAL JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA)

Preferred by the Union of India, the challenge in this appeal is addressed to order dated 5th September 2024 passed by learned Single Judge in the pending writ petition.

2. The prayer in the writ petition filed by the petitioner- South Indian Sugar Mills Association, Karnataka-respondent No.1 herein, was to set aside Notification dated 26th December 2023. Also was the prayer to direct the respondents to remove the sugar from the purview of the Jute Packaging Materials (Compulsory Use in Packing Commodities) Act, 1987.

2.1 By the said Notification dated 26th December 2023 of the Ministry of Textiles, issued in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3 of the Jute Packaging Materials (Compulsory Use in Packing Commodities) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘JPM Act’), it is provided that 100% food grains and 20% sugar of the total production shall be required to be packed in jute packaging material manufactured in India from raw jute production in India.

2.2 Learned Single Judge passed interim order dated 5th September 2024 and stayed the Notifications dated 26th December 2023 which was valid upto June 2024 and the subsequent notification dated 28th June 2024 whereby the period of validity of the notification came to be extended upto 30th September 2024.

2.3 While examining the challenge to the impugned order of learned Single Judge, the court is aware that the order under challenge is an interim order. Learned Single Judge stayed the Notification which was the principal prayer in the petition. The writ petition was ordered to be posted next on 24th September 2024.

2.4 It may be true that ordinarily the writ appeal would not be entertained against interim orders, for, by their very nature, the interim orders do not determine the final rights of the parties. It is true that pure and simplicitor interim orders could not be termed as a judgment to be entertained in appeal. However, the orders, even if interim, but which have the trappings of finality, would be treated as judgment, liable to be examined in the appeal for their merits, and the appeal would maintain thereagainst.

2.5 Recent decision of the Supreme Court in Shyam Sel and Power Limited vs. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd. [(2023) 1 SCC 634], deserves to be referred to. The Apex Court discussed therein, in the context of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Calcutta High Court, as to which type of order could be classified as judgment for the purpose of intra court appeal. Addressing the question when can an order be construed as 'judgment' under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, it was observed that orders in order to be amenable to Letters Patent jurisdiction must have been such possessing the quality of finality.

2.6 In Shyam Sel and Power Limited (supra), the Supreme Court observed thus,

"It could thus be seen that though this Court has held that the term ‘judgment’ used in Letters Patent could not be given a narrower meaning as is given to the term ‘judgment’ used in CPC and that it should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation, however, at the same time, each and every order passed by the trial judge could not be construed to be a ‘judgment’ inasmuch as there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It has been held that the word ‘judgment’ has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not in a narrower sense. It has been held that where an order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendants, it will undoubtedly be treated as a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Letters Patent so as to be appealable to a larger Bench." (para 18)

2.7 It was thus held that whether the order could be said to be a 'judgment' within the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, would depend on the facts and circumstance of each case. It was observed and held that for such an order to be considered as judgment, it must have 'traits and trappings

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