2022 Supreme(Online)(Kar) 40040
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF MARCH, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.7560/2021
BETWEEN
1.
MOHAN DAS SHETTY,
S/O LATE K DEJOO SHETTY,
77 YEARS,
<OWNER OF MPP TECHNOLOGIES P. LTD.,
ANTHARASANAHALLI INDUSTRIAL AREA,
TUMUKURU TOWN,
TUMUKURU 3 572 106.
2.
SURESH REDDY,
S/O SRI. HULEPPA,
52 YEARS,
GENERAL MANAGER OF MPP
TECHNOLOGIES P. LTD.,
ANTHARASANAHALLI INDUSTRIAL AREA,
TUMUKURU TOWN,
TUMUKURU 3 572 106.
3.
BALAKRISHNA,
S/O LATE SUNDARA BHANDARY,
43 YEARS,
<HR OF MPP TECHNOLOGIES P. LTD.,
ANTHARASANAHALLI INDUSTRIAL AREA,
TUMUKURU TOWN,
TUMUKURU 3 572 106.
... PETITIONERS
[BY SRI.S.G.BHAGAVAN, ADVOCATE]
2
AND
1.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
TUMKUR TOWN POLICE STATION,
TUMKUR TOWN CIRCLE,
TUMAKURU 3 572 101.
2.
SMT.NALINA,
W/O LATE MANJUNATHA H D,
32 YEARS,
HIREKODATHAKAL,
KPRA HOBLI, TUMAKURU TALUK,
TUMAKURU 3 572 104.
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.V.G.RAJENDRA, ADVOCATE FOR R2;
SMT.YASHODA P.K., HCGP FOR R1]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C. PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN FIR IN
CR.NO.126/2021 DATED 10.09.2021 OF TUMKURU TOWN POLICE
STATION, TUMAKURU CIRCLE, TUMAKURU REGISTERED FOR AN
OFFENCE P/U/S. 304(A) AND 34 OF IPC AND PENDING ON THE
COURT OF 2nd ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE (Jr.Dn.) AND JMFC
TUMAKURU.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
The petitioners are before this Court calling in question
proceedings in Crime No.126/2021 registered for offences
punishable under Section 304A read with Section 34 of IPC.
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2.
Heard Sri. S.G. Bhagavan, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioners, Smt. Yashoda K.P., learned HCGP appearing
for respondent No.1 and Sri. V.G. Rajendra, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.2 and have perused the material on
record.
3.
The petitioners are the owners of one M.P.P.
Technologies Private Limited. Respondent No.2 is the wife of an
employee, who died in an accident that occurred in the factory
premises owned by the petitioners. One H.D. Manjunath, a
contract worker, who was performing certain jobs of cleaning of
the roof of the factory on 05.09.2021, fell down and sustained
injuries and succumbed to the same on 10.09.2021. The
Inspector of factories, who visited the premises also recorded the
incident and also noticed the fact that family of the deceased
had been adequately compensated. It is for that reason, no
proceedings under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 was
initiated by the Inspector of factories against the petitioners.
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4.
After all the aforesaid facts and the incident, a
complaint is registered by the wife of the deceased on
10.09.2021 alleging that the reason for death of her husband
deceased was an unkept factory premises with no safety
measures. The complaint becomes an FIR for offence punishable
under Section 304A of IPC. It is germane to notice Section 304A,
it reads as follows:
<[304A. Causing death by negligence.4
Whoever causes the death of any person by doing
any rash or negligent act not amounting to
culpable homicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.]=
Section 304A of the IPC has two components:
Causing death either by rash or a negligent act.
Neither rash nor negligent act can be attributed to the
petitioners for the unfortunate incident of the deceased dying
due to an accident that occurred when he fell down while
painting the roof of the factory. The Apex Court in the case of
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AMBALAL D. BHATT V. STATE OF GUJARAT1, has held as
follows:
<10. It appears to us that in a prosecution for
an offence under Section 304-A, the mere fact that
an accused contravenes certain rules or regulations
in the doing of an act which causes death of
another, does not establish that the death was the
result of a rash or negligent act or that any such act
was the proximate and efficient cause of the death.
If that were so, the acquittal of the appellant for
contravention of the provisions of the Act and the
Rules would itself have been an answer and we
would
have
then
examined
to
what
extent
additional evidence of his acquittal would have to
be allowed, but since that is not the criteria, we
have to determine whether the appellant's act in
giving only one batch number to all the four lots
manufactured on November 12, 1962, in preparing
Batch No. 211105, was the cause of deaths and
whether those deaths were a direct consequence of
the appellants' act, that is, whether the appellants'
act is the direct result of a rash and negligent act
and that act was the proximate and efficient cause
1 (1973) 3 SCC 525
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without the intervention of another's negligence. As
observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v.
Omkar Rampratap [(1902) 4 Bom LR 679] the act
causing the deaths <must be the causa causans; it
is not enough that it may have been the cause sine
qua non=. This view has been adopted by this Court
in
several
decisions.
In
Kurban
Hussein
Mohammedali Rangwala v. State of Maharashtra
[(1965) 2 SCR 622] the accused who had
manufactured wet paints without a licence was
acquitted of the charge under Section 304-A
because it was held that the mere fact that he
allowed the burners to be used in the same room in
which varnish and turpentine were stored, even
though it would be a negligent act, would not be
enough to make t