2023 Supreme(Online)(Kar) 34686
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
MR SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM, J
SMT. LAKSHMAMMA DAUGHTER OF LATE JAVARE GOWDA – Appellant
Versus
SMT. RANI D/O RAJENDRA – Respondent
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 1361 OF 2016|REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 1360 OF 2016
For the Appellants/Petitioners: SRI.P.M.SIDDAMALLAPPA
For the Respondents: SRI. B V GANGIREDDY, SRI.HARSHA.D.JOSHI
A third party cannot resist execution based on unregistered sale deeds tied to judgment debtors, as independent title is required for standing in partition suits.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Sections 94(e), 97(21) - Partition suit - Decree holders challenged the appellate Court's judgment allowing third-party applicants to resist execution, claiming rights based on unregistered sale deeds - The executing Court found that such rights could not be established since third parties trace rights through judgment debtors who suffered decrees. (Paras 10-12)
(B) Third-party applications - Maintenance requires demonstrating superior title and rights independent of judgment debtors - The appellate Court's ruling allowing such applications was found erroneous; parties holding unregistered sale deeds had no locus standi to resist execution - The principle of pre-existing rights in joint family properties reiterated. (Paras 9-11)
Facts of the case:
These appeals arise from a partition suit where decree holders sought to assert rights against third parties claiming possession based on unregistered deeds. The appellate Court misapplied legal principles regarding rights in partition suits.
Findings of Court:
The appellate Court acted erroneously in allowing the third-party applications, failing to consider absence of independent title or superior rights in favor of such applicants.
Issues: Whether third-party applicants had rights to resist execution based on unregistered sale deeds and if the appellate Court's findings had legal backing.
Ratio Decidendi: Third-party claims rooted in rights from judgment debtors were deemed legally insufficient; a person must have independent rights to be eligible for resisting execution proceedings.
Result: Appeals allowed and earlier judgments set aside.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. disputes arising from a partition suit requiring legal clarity on title and possession. (Para 1 , 2 , 3) |
| 2. legal implications of allowing third-party claims on unregistered deeds. (Para 4 , 5 , 6) |
| 3. requirement of demonstrating independent title for third-party applicants in property disputes. (Para 9 , 10 , 11) |
JUDGMENT
These two captioned appeals, arising out of the partition suit, are filed by decree holders assailing the judgment and decree rendered by the appellate Court in R.A.Nos.469/2014 and 466/2014.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank in the execution petition.
3. The decree-holders instituted a suit for partition in O.S.No.265/1995. The said suit was contested by the family members who are arrayed as defendants. Both the parties let in evidence to substantiate their respective claims. The trial Court decreed the suit by the judgment th and decree dated 28.2.2002 thereby awarding 2/6 share together to the decree holders in the suit schedule property. Based on the preliminary decree drawn in O.S.No.265/1995, the decree holders filed final decree proceedings in FDP.No.28/2002. In the final decree proceedings, the northern side portion to the extent of 2/6th share in Survey No.93/32 was allotted to the share of the decree holders. The decree holders based on final th decree have taken possession to the extent of 1/6 share. The decree holders however found that some third parties are asserting right and therefore, the decree holders were compelled to file execution petition in Ex.No.770/2007. The present respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5 and respondents 3(a to d) asserting right and title over the remaining 1/6 th share filed an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. The third party applicants are asserting right and title alleging that one of the judgment debtors has conveyed the property in question vide registered sale deed dated 25.3.1989. The said applications filed under Order XXI Rule 99, 100, 191 R/w Section 94 (e) of CPC and under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC were strongly resisted by the decree-holders by filing objections. The executing Court having examined the contentions of the third party applicants however found that the third party applicants are tracing their rights through the judgment debtors who have suffered preliminary decree and final decree. It is in this background, the executing Court was of the view that the third party applicants cannot maintain applications under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. Consequently, the applications were rejected. Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of the applications, Anthony Manjula preferred R.A.No.466/2014 who is arrayed as respondent No.5 in RSA.No.1361/2016 and respondent No.1 in RSA.No.1360/2016. Rani, Vijaya Kumar, K. Jayaram and Ebneazer preferred R.A.No.469/2014 who are arrayed as respondents 1 to 4 in RSA.No.1361/2016 and respondents 2 to 5 in RSA.No.1360/2016.
4. The appellate Court has allowed the appeals on the ground that third party applicants have acquired legal right and therefore, under the agreements they have locus to resist delivery of possession. The appellate Court referring to Exs.P3, 39 and 40 found that the sale deeds executed in favour of Anthony Manjula and Jayaram are prior to the institution of the suit while the sale deeds of Vijaya Kumar and Ebneazer are after passing of the final decree and before conclusion of the preliminary decree proceedings. Referring to the documents, the appellate Court was of the view that third party applicants have substantiated that they have constructed buildings and they are in possession of the said buildings. The appellate Court has proceeded to entertain the third party applications on the premise that the decree holders ought to have impleaded the third party applicants and had they impleaded the third party applicants, they would have worked out their equitable rights in the pending final decree proceedings. On these set of reasoning, the appellate Court