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2025 Supreme(Online)(Kar) 27625
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR, J
SRI PUNITH SHETTY S/O PADMANAB SHETTY – Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KARNATAKA – Respondent
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 9884 OF 2023 | (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)
For the Appellants/Petitioners: SMT. HALEEMA AMEEN, SRI. ASHOK KUMAR SHETTY.K
For the Respondents: SMT. WAHEEDA, HCGP
A telephone call lacking evidence of assault or obstruction does not meet the legal criteria for Sections 353, 506, and 507 IPC, warranting quashing of the FIR.
Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code - Sections 353, 506, 507 - Quashing of FIR - Accused petitioned under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash FIR concerning allegations made via a phone call, with no physical presence at the scene - Court ruled that vague allegations insufficiently constitute the mentioned offences - Emphasis on necessity of showing intention to obstruct a public servant’s duties - No ingredients for offences found in the case against the petitioner. (Paras 1, 3-12)
(B) Quashing of FIR - Courts exercising power should act cautiously to prevent abuse of process - FIR quashed as no essential ingredients of the alleged offences met, allowing for fairness in legal proceedings. (Paras 4, 11, 12)
Facts of the case:
The petitioner was accused in an FIR for offences under Sections 353, 506, and 507 IPC, based on allegations from a phone call to a police officer without any physical encounter, constituting vague accusations that lack necessary legal elements.
Findings of Court:
The court determined that there was no evidence of assault or any criminal force employed by the petitioner toward a public servant, leading to quashing of the FIR as unreasonable.
Issues: The primary issue was whether the phone conversation constituted the alleged offences without the physical presence of the accused.
Ratio Decidendi: The court concluded that absent any physical evidence of criminal actions or intention, the FIR was illegitimate and should be dismissed.
Result: Criminal petition allowed; FIR quashed.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. the petitioner seeks to quash criminal proceedings. (Para 1) |
| 2. counsel argues on the absence of evidence of crime. (Para 2 , 3 , 4) |
| 3. court reviews complaint and allegations. (Para 5 , 6 , 7) |
| 4. court orders in favor of the petitioner. (Para 8) |
| 5. court's analysis of requisite elements for offences. (Para 9 , 10 , 11) |
| 6. court quashes fir due to lack of merit. (Para 12) |
ORAL ORDER
In this petition, the petitioner who is the sole accused in Crime No.75/2023 dated 12.08.2023 seeks quashing of the aforesaid proceedings registered against him for the offences punishable under Sections 353 , 506 and 507 of IPC.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record.
3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that a suo moto complaint is was said to have been given by respondent No.2- the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, respondent No.1 registered an FIR in Crime No.75/2023 for the alleged offences under Sections 353 , 506 and 507 of IPC. It is an undisputed fact as borne out from the material on record that the petitioner- accused was not physically present at the police station and instead the entire allegations revolve around a phone call said to have been made by the petitioner to respondent No.2 so as to enable him to register an offence under Section 304-A IPC.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Manik Taneja and another Vs. State of Karnataka and another – (2015) 7 SCC 423, which has been followed by this Court in subsequent judgment in order to point out that general / vague / bald allegations would not be sufficient to constitute the offences under Sections 353 or 506 or 507 of IPC especially based on an alleged phone conversation, which does not indicate that any of the said offences have been committed by the petitioner as contended in the impugned complaint. It is therefore submitted that the impugned proceedings against the petitioner deserves to be quashed.
5. Per contra, learned HCGP submits that there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed.
6. Before adverting to rival contentions, it would be apposite to extract the averments made in the complaint, which reads as under:
7. In Manik Taneja’s case (supra), regarding the offences under Sections 353 and 506 of IPC, the Apex Court held as under:
“10. So far as the issue regarding the registration of FIR under Section 353 IPC is concerned, it has to be seen whether by posting a comment on the Facebook page of the traffic police, the conviction under that section could be maintainable. Before considering the materials on record, we may usefully refer to Section 353 IPC which reads as follows:
“353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.— Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
A reading of the above provision shows that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official d
