1. In this application which involves the interpretation of S.33 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioner who was an employee of a concern called The Indian Tin Industries, Private Limited, and who was dismissed on 17/09/1958 for misconduct during the pendency of proceedings relating to an industrial dispute before a Labour Court, questions the correctness of an order made by the Labour Court striking off an application presented by the Company under the proviso to S.33 (2) (b) of the Act for approval of the dismissal of the petitioner.

2. In the proceedings before the Labour Court touching the industrial dispute, an Award was made by it which was published in the official gazette either on November 25, 1958, or on the 26th or 27th of that month. Before this Award was published, the petitioner had been dismissed by the Company on September 17, 1958, after the holding of an enquiry into an act of misconduct with which he was charged. On September 18, 1958, the Company made an application to the Labour Court seeking approval of the action taken by it. Although this application was pending before the Labour Court for at least two months and eight days before the Award was published and the Award became enforceable under the provisions of S.17A after the expiry of thirty days from the date of the publication, the Labour Court very surprisingly made no order on that application. When, however, the Company asked the Labour Court to strike off its application on the ground that it had become functus officio, it acceded to that request. It. is this order made by the Labour Court which is challenged by the petitioner on the ground that an application properly presented by the Company during the pendency of the proceedings relating to the Industrial Dispute, could not have been struck off by the Labour Court but should have been decided in obedience to the requirement of S.33 (5) of the Act.

3. The Labour Court thought that such adjudication was no longer possible since no adjudication upon an application under the proviso to S.33 (2) (b) was possible after the proceedings before the Labour Court relating to the industrial dispute had terminated. This view which the Labour Court reached rested on the provisions of Sections I7A, 20 (3), the proviso to S.33 (2) (b) and S.33 (5) of the Act.

4. S.20 (3) specifies the date of the commencement of a proceeding before a Labour Court and the date on which that proceeding terminates. It states that that proceeding shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of the reference and shall he deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under S.17A. That sub-section reads :
"20. xxxx xxxx xxxx
(3) Proceedings before an arbitrator under S.10A or before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of the reference of the dispute for arbitration or adjudication as the case may be, and such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under S.17A."
S.17A to which S.20 (3) refers, provides that an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under S.17.

5. It is clear from these two provisions that 3, proceeding before a Labour Court which commences on the date of the reference to it, terminates after the expiry of thirty days from the date on which its award is published under S.17.

6. Now, that period of thirty days in this case had long expired before the Labour Court made the impugned order by which it struck off the application presented by the Company, which means that when the Labour Court made the impugned order, there was no proceeding pending before it relating to the industrial dispute in connection with which there was a reference to it under S.10. The short point which this case presents is whether the termination of the proceedings relating to the industrial dispute brought about a deprivation of the jurisdiction o