The State cannot deprive a citizen of their property for public purposes without following the due process of law and initiating formal acquisition proceedings as mandated by Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS NOT TO FORM / WIDEN THE ROAD OR ROADS IN THE PETITIONER'S LAND WITHOUT FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND ETC.

THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

ORAL ORDER

1. The captioned writ petition is instituted invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus directing respondent Nos.1 to 5 to duly notify, acquire and thereafter form a road over the subject property strictly in accordance with law. The grievance of the petitioners is founded on an imminent and real apprehension that the respondent–authorities, without initiating any lawful acquisition proceedings, are attempting to lay a road by encroaching upon the petitioners’ land and demolishing the immovable structures standing thereon. It is in this backdrop, the petitioners are constrained to approach this Court seeking protective and corrective reliefs.

2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and the learned standing counsel appearing for respondent Nos.3 to 6.

Perused the material on record with utmost care.

3. On a meticulous examination of the records, particularly the photographs produced at Annexures–F, F1 and F2, this Court finds prima facie substance in the apprehension voiced by the petitioners. The said photographs unmistakably indicate that the respondent– authorities have already demarcated/marked the petitioners’ property with an apparent intention to carve out a road. Such an action, if undertaken dehors the procedure established by law, cannot be countenanced.

4. It is trite that though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it continues to be a valuable constitutional right protected under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. The said provision, which embodies a constitutional limitation on State action, mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The expression “authority of law” has been consistently interpreted to mean a validly enacted law coupled with strict adherence to the procedure prescribed therein.

5. The right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, though not elevated to the pedestal of a fundamental right, nevertheless partakes the character of a constitutional guarantee against arbitrary State action. The State and its instrumentalities cannot, under the guise of public purpose, appropriate or utilize private property without resorting to a legally sanctioned acquisition mechanism. Any attempt to dispossess a citizen without initiating acquisition proceedings and without payment of just compensation would amount to a colourable exercise of power and a direct infraction of Article 300A.

6. In the present case, respondent Nos.1 and 2, being the acquiring authorities, and respondent Nos.3 to 6, being the beneficiary agencies, may indeed have the authority to form a public road in furtherance of public interest. However, such authority is not unbridled. The formation of a road, howsoever laudable the object may be, must necessarily be preceded by due acquisition proceedings in strict conformity with the mandate of law.

The photographs on record clearly indicate that the respondents are poised to proceed with the formation of the road by interfering with the petitioners’ possession and by potentially demolishing existing structures, without following due process.

7. This Court cannot remain a silent spectator to such high-handed action. If permitted, the same would render the constitutional safeguard under Article 300A of the Constitution of India illusory and reduce the rule of law to a mere formality. Therefore, this Court is of the considered vie