The court held that while it will not interfere with an ex parte interim injunction at the appeal stage, the Trial Court must expeditiously dispose of applications for granting and vacating such injunctions, especially when a statutory authority is exercising its legal powers.

MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.2659 OF 2026 (CPC)

THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER ORDER 43 RULE 1(r) OF CPC., PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 07.01.2026 PASSED ON I.A.NO.1 IN O.S.NO.25013/2026 ON THE FILE OF THE LXXIV ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, MAYO HALL UNIT, BENGALURU (CCH-75).

THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA

ORAL JUDGMENT

This Miscellaneous First Appeal is preferred by the defendant–Greater Bengaluru Authority (GBA), calling in question the legality and correctness of the ex parte ad interim temporary injunction order dated 07.01.2026 passed on I.A.No.1 in O.S.No.25013/2026 on the file of the LXXIV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as the “Trial Court”), whereby the Trial Court restrained the appellant–defendant from demolishing or interfering with the suit schedule property till the next date of hearing.

The plaintiff, claiming to be the absolute owner in possession of residential Apartment No.303, Third Floor, Devaraprasad Brigade Palace, on the strength of a registered sale deed dated 27.06.2025, instituted a suit for permanent injunction. Along with the suit, the plaintiff filed I.A.No.1 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking an ex parte temporary injunction. The Trial Court, upon consideration of the documents produced and on apprehending demolition proceeded to grant an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from demolishing or interfering with the suit schedule property.

The appellant-defendant, being a statutory authority constituted under the provisions of the Greater Bengaluru Governance Act, 2024 (for short, “GBG Act”), contended that upon noticing unauthorized construction in the schedule property, an inspection was conducted and a mahazar was drawn on 23.12.2025, wherein it was found that an extent of about 67.62 square meters of unauthorized construction had been put up on the terrace floor. Pursuant thereto, a statutory notice and demolition order dated 30.12.2025 came to be issued, calling upon the respondent-plaintiff to demolish the unauthorized structure. According to the appellant, despite service of notice and affording an opportunity, the respondent-plaintiff neither replied nor complied with the statutory directions. Instead, the respondent-plaintiff instituted the present suit and obtained a ex parte order of injunction from the Trial Court.

Learned counsel for the appellant–defendant contends that the impugned ex parte interim order passed by the Trial Court is wholly unsustainable both on facts and in law. It is submitted that the appellant, being a statutory authority constituted under the provisions of the GBG Act, has initiated action strictly in accordance with law upon noticing unauthorized construction in the suit schedule property. It is further contended that the plaintiff suppressed material facts relating to the issuance of notice and demolition proceedings. Trial Court, without adverting to these material aspects and without examining the nature of the statutory action, proceeded to grant and extend the ex parte injunction.

Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the Trial Court failed to consider the settled principle that when action is taken under a statute by a competent authority, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to interdict such action is limited. It is contended that the respondent ought to have availed the remedies available under the statute and that the civil suit itself is not maintainable in light of the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Smt. Kavitha Jain and Another Vs. The Commissioner, BBMP and Others , W.P.No.9934/2023 D.D 17.08.2023 (Kavitha Jain). It is also urged that the ex parte order, which is intended to operate only for a limited duration, has been extended from time to time without assigning reasons, thereby c