An FIR under Section 67 of the IT Act requires allegations of obscene/sexually explicit content. Furthermore, for non-cognizable offences, compliance with Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C. is mandatory; failure to do so renders the registration of the FIR an abuse of the process of law.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CRIME NO.484/2018 ON THE FILE OF THE I ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE BENGALURU AT ANNEXURE-B AND ALL CONSEQUENTIAL PROCEEDINGS ARISING THERE FROM AS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS OF LAW AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. NATARAJ

ORAL ORDER

1. The petitioners are before this Court challenging the registration of Crime No.484/2018 by respondent No.1 for the offences punishable under Sections 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (henceforth referred to as 'Act, 2000' for short) and under Section 507 of Indian Penal Code (henceforth referred to as, 'IPC' for short).

2. The petitioner contends that respondent No.2 informed respondent No.1 in writing on 23.10.2018 alleging that the petitioner had used offensive language against him and circulated the same through WhatsApp from mobile No.9900200222, and uploaded it on the social media platforms. On that basis, respondent No.2 claimed that the petitioner had defamed him in the eyes of the general public. Based on the said information, respondent No.1 registered Crime No.484/2018 for the offences punishable under Section 67 of the Act, 2000 and under Section 507 of IPC.

3. Being aggrieved by the registration of First Information Report, the petitioner is before this Court.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Section 67 of the Act, 2000 relates to uploading sexually explicit content using a computer source with an intent to appeal to the prurient interest of the recipient. He submits that a perusal of the complaint does not disclose any allegation attracting the ingredients of Section 67 of the Act, 2000. He contends that at the most it would fall within the contours of Section 66A of the Act, 2000. However, in view of the judgment of the Honb'le Apex Court in the case of Shreya Singhal and Ors. v. Union of India - AIR 2015 SC 1523, whereby Section 66A of the Act, 2000 was struck down, the message uploaded by the petitioner cannot be construed as an offence under the Act, 2000. He thus, contends that the registration of an FIR for an offence under Section 67 of the Act, 2000 is misplaced.

5. In so far as Section 507 of IPC is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the said offence is non-cognizable and therefore, the respondent was bound to comply with the requirement of Section 155(2) of Criminal Procedure Code. He contends that in the absence of such compliance, registration of the impugned FIR amounts to an abuse of the process of law. Hence, he seeks that the same be quashed.

6. Respondent No.2, though served with a notice, has not appeared.

7. The learned Additional SPP for respondent No.1/State submits that the FIR was also registered for an offence under Section 507 of IPC and therefore, no indulgence can be shown for quashing the FIR.

8. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional SPP.

9. A perusal of the information furnished by respondent No.2 to respondent No.1 would indicate that the petitioner had allegedly uploaded certain offensive messages on WhatsApp and on other social media platforms. However, the respondent No.2 has not spelt out the contents of the message that was uploaded by the petitioner. Be that as it may, respondent No.2 has not specifically averred that the petitioner had uploaded any obscene material regard