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2024 Supreme(Online)(KER) 6515

HIGH COURT OF KERALA
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, G. GIRISH, JJ
E.G. JIBULAL – Appellant
Versus
THE TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD – Respondent
WP(C) 6672/2024



Advocates:
PRATHEESH.P ANJANA KANNATH MARIYA JOSE

Writ jurisdiction does not apply to enforce civil liability arising purely out of a contract.

Headnote:

Writ Jurisdiction - Contractual Dispute - The court dismissed the writ petition seeking disbursement of pending dues from the respondent Travancore Devaswom Board, holding that the contractual obligations are matters of private law and a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not lie to enforce a civil liability arising purely out of a contract.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to clear pending dues and consider representations related to the supply of plastic containers for a temple under the management of the 1st respondent Travancore Devaswom Board.

Finding of the Court:

The court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of maintainability, without expressing anything on the factual contentions raised by the petitioner.

Issues: The issue was whether the petitioner, involved in a contractual dispute with the respondent, can invoke the writ jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the reliefs sought.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that contractual obligations are matters of private law and a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not lie to enforce a civil liability arising purely out of a contract.

Final Decision: The writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed on the ground of maintainability.

JUDGMENT

Anil K. Narendran, J

The petitioner, who is the proprietor of ‘Coinco Plast’, which is engaged in manufacturing plastic containers and other plastic products, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to clear the pending dues from the 1st respondent Travancore Devaswom Board covered by Exts.P1 and P2 invoices dated 10.01.2022 and 03.03.2022. The petitioner has also sought for a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1, 2 and 5 to consider and pass orders on Exts.P3 to P5 representations dated 27.04.2022 and 07.03.2022.

2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the petitioner submitted quotation for supply of 250 ml plastic containers for distribution of ‘Neypayasam’ at Chettikulangara Bhagavathi Temple, which is a temple under the management of the 1st respondent Travancore Devaswom Board, pursuant to the tender notification issued by the 3rd respondent Deputy Devaswom Commissioner. Though the petitioner supplied 250 ml containers with MW cap, as evidenced by Exts.P1 and P2 invoices, a total sum of Rs.2,71,311/- is pending payment. The petitioner submitted Exts.P3 to P5 representations and thereafter moved this Court in this writ petition, seeking the aforesaid reliefs.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for Travancore Devaswom Board for the respondents.

4. The issue that requires consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the petitioner, who supplied plastic containers, based on the quotation submitted, for distribution of Neypayasam at Chettikulangara Bhagavathi Temple, which is a temple under the management of the 1st respondent Travancore Devaswom Board, can invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the aforesaid reliefs.

5. In State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 216] the Apex Court reiterated that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the proper procedure for adjudicating disputes relating to the enforcement of contractual obligations. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence of an alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue a writ, but ordinarily, that would be a good ground for refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226. It is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be a ground for the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of an alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify a breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising the prerogative of issuing writs.

6. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises [(2003) 7 SCC 410] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the respondent had filed a writ petition before the High Court for refund of the amount. The High Court posed two questions, namely, (a) whether the forfeiture of the security deposit is without the authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act; and (b) whether the writ pet

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