Vague allegations without specific words do not establish offences under IPC Sections 294(b), 506, and 509, leading to quashing of prosecution.

ORDER

The petitioner is the accused in C.C.No.152 of 2019 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court IX, Ernakulam.

2. The offences alleged against him are under Sections 294 (b) , 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ). The crime was registered on 24.01.2019 alleging the offence under Section 509 of on the basis of information furnished by the 2^nd respondent. The 2^nd respondent stated to the Sub Inspector of Police that on 20.01.2019 at about 4.30 p.m. the accused showered abusive and humiliating words on his wife and mother. It was also stated that there was a financial transaction between the petitioner and the 2^nd respondent. On the date of occurrence the 2^nd respondent and his family members were returning after attending a function at Pachalam. Noticing the arrival of the 2^nd respondent and his family members, the accused came near the gate of the 2^nd respondent and showered abusive words. Though the 2^nd respondent intimated the Police, by the time the Police arrived at the scene, the accused had left the place.

3. On completion of the investigation, the Police submitted the Final Report, which is produced as Annexure A1 in this Crl.M.C. In the Final Report offences under Section 294 (b) , 506 and 509 of IPC are alleged against the petitioner.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the prosecution proceedings are not sustainable. He pointed out that the date of alleged occurrence is 20.01.2019, however, the FIR was registered only on 24.01.2019 and there was no explanation for the delay involved in registering the FIR. He also pointed out that the only allegation in the First Information Statement is that the petitioner showered abusive words on the wife and mother of the 2^nd respondent. He, therefore, pointed out that the allegation in the Final Report and the First Information Statement are inconsistent.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the order in Preethimon v. State of Kerala [2008 (2) KLT 666] and submitted that a vague or general statement in the FIR that the accused showered obscene words is not enough to constitute an offence under Section 294 (b) of the IPC . In the said reported order, this Court had held that it is necessary to state the words uttered by the accused.

Further this Court held that the prosecution would not be justified in bringing in, for the first time in the evidence, the words allegedly spoken to by the accused. This Court had observed that if the exact words are not mentioned in the FIR it will give room for improving the case during trial. The learned counsel also made reference to the decision in Latheef v. State of Kerala [2014 (2) KLT 987]. This Court in the said reported decision had held that every abusive word or every humiliating word cannot by itself said to be obscene as defined under the IPC . The learned counsel also relied on the reported decision in Sangeetha Lakshmana v. State of Kerala [2008 (2) KLT 745], in support of his contention that mere uttering of obscene and abusive words is not sufficient to attract the offence under Section 294 (b) of the . He on the basis of the law laid down by this Court in various decisions referred above, submitted that the offence under (b) of the is not attracted in this case. He pointed out that the abusive words alleged to have been used by the petitioner are not specifically mentioned in the First Information Statement. Even in the Final Report, no specific obscene words have been pointed out.

6. The learned Public Prosecutor, referring to the 161 statement of the wife of the 2^nd respondent pointed out that the exact words used by the petitioner are spoken to by the said witness. Though the contention is factually correct, in the light of the law laid down in Preethimon (Supra), the said contention of the learned Public Prosecutor cannot be accepted. I find considerable merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the offence under