JUDGMENT

Alexander Thomas, J.

The prayers in the above Crl.Appeal are as follows :

“.......... to set aside the impugned order of the court below dt. 05.12.2022 in CMP 275/2022 in SC 3/2016 of the Special Court II, NIA Ernakulam.”

2. Heard Sri.V.T.Raghunath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri.Suvin R.Menon, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the respondent-Union of India represented by the NIA.

3. The order under challenge in this case is the impugned order rendered on 05.12.2022 in Crl.M.P No.275/2022 filed by the appellant in Sessions Case, S.C No.3/2016 on the files of the Special Court for Trial of NIA cases, Ernakulam, whereby the request of the prosecution, under Sec.311, for re-calling and re-examination of certain witnesses and under Sec.91 of the Cr.P.C, for production of certain documents, have been allowed in part.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that, an order in the nature of the present impugned order, rendered under Sec.311 of the Cr.P.C and Sec.91 of the Cr.P.C, will not be an interlocutory order, as envisaged in Sec.21(1) of the NIA Act and would be an order having final nature or an intermediate order, as understood in the celebrated decisions rendered by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551] and as later amplified by a subsequent verdict of the Apex Court in V.C.Shukla v. State through CBI [(1980) SCC Crl. 695].

5. Per contra, Sri.Suvin R.Menon, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the respondent (NIA), would submit that the Apex Court has categorically held in the decision in Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam [(2009) 5 SCC 153] (para 5), that an order passed by the trial court under Sec.311 of the Cr.P.C and under Sec.91 of the Cr.P.C, can only be an interlocutory order and therefore, revision in terms of Sec.397 of the Cr.P.C is barred and would urge that the said decision of the Apex Court, in Sethuraman's case supra [(2009) 5 SCC 153], is the decision on the very same point, as to whether an order passed under Sec.311 & Sec.91 of the Cr.P.C is interlocutory, etc.

6. Faced with the situation, Sri.V.T.Raghunath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would submit, on the basis of instructions of his party, that leave may be granted to the appellant to withdraw this Crl.Appeal with liberty to file a fresh petition under Sec.482 of the Cr.P.C, to challenge the very same impugned order.

7. To the above, Sri.Suvin R.Menon, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the respondent (NIA), would point out that the invocation of the inherent powers of the High Court, under Sec.482 of the Cr.P.C, in regard to the cases covered by the NIA and in cases covered by the bar under Sec.21(1) of the NIA Act, is regulated by the strict principles laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Mastiguda Aboobacker v. NIA [2020 (6) KLT 522 (FB)]. In the light of these submissions, leave is accorded to the petitioner to withdraw the above Crl.Appeal. Liberty is accorded to the petitioner to work out his remedies, strictly in accordance with law.

With these observations and directions, the above Crl.Appeal will stand dismissed as withdrawn.

ALEXANDER THOMAS JUDGE