SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2024 Supreme(Online)(KER) 13455

HIGH COURT OF KERALA
C.S. DIAS, J
ABDUL SALAM.K – Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KERALA – Respondent
Bail Appl. 4932/2024



Exceptional circumstances must exist to justify the grant of pre-arrest bail; serious accusations necessitate custodial interrogation.

Headnote:

Bail - Pre-Arrest Bail - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 438; Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 286; Explosives Act, 1884, Section 9 - The court denied pre-arrest bail, emphasizing the serious nature of accusations and the necessity for custodial interrogation, adhering to established legal principles regarding the grant of anticipatory bail.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners, accused in a crime relating to alleged use of explosives against a complainant, sought pre-arrest bail. The first petitioner was arrested, making the application concerning only the second petitioner.

Finding of the Court:

The court found prima facie evidence against the second petitioner and ruled that the necessity for custodial interrogation justified the denial of bail.

Issues: Whether the second petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the presence of serious accusations.

Ratio Decidendi: The power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary and should be exercised in exceptional circumstances. The seriousness of the accusations necessitated custodial interrogation.

Final Decision: The bail application was dismissed.

ORDER

The application is filed under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Code’, for short), for an order of pre-arrest bail.

2. The petitioners are the accused 1 and 2 in Crime No. 613/2024 of the Vadakara Police Station, Kozhikode, registered against them, for allegedly committing the offences punishable under Section 286 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 9 of the Explosives Act, 1884 .

3.The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that during the pendency of the bail application, 1st petitioner was arrested. Therefore, his application has become infructuous. Hence, he was confining the bail application to the 2 nd petitioner/2 nd accused alone.

4.The crux of the prosecution case is that; on

04.06.2024, at around 21.30 hours, the accused went on a motorcycle and hurled explosives substances in the courtyard of the defacto complainant and caused an explosion. Thus, the accused have committed the above offences.

5. Heard; Sri.P.S.Binu, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Smt.Seetha.S, the learned Public Prosecutor.

6.The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are totally innocent of the accusations levelled against them. There is no material to substantiate that the 2nd petitioner has committed the above offences. In fact, some person had thrown fire crackers into the house of the defacto complainant in connection with the election results. The 2nd petitioner’s custodial interrogation is not necessary and no recovery is to be effected. Therefore, the 2nd petitioner is entitled to an order of pre-arrest bail.

7.The learned Public Prosecutor seriously opposed the application. He submitted that there are incriminating materials to substantiate the petitioners involvement in the crime. The petitioners had thrown explosives substances in the house of the defacto complainant and threatened them.

The 2nd petitioner’s custodial interrogation is necessary and recovery is to be effected for the proper and full investigation of the crime. Therefore, the application may be dismissed.

8.On an evaluation of materials on record, it can be seen that there is a specific allegation made against the 2nd petitioner, that he along with the 1st petitioner had hurled explosives substances in the house of the defacto complainant and caused an explosion, that too to scare the defacto complainant. Prima facie the accusation levelled against the petitioners are grave and serious.

9. In Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar [2024 KHC OnLine 6137], the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to the earlier precedents on the point, has succinctly laid down the law in the following lines:

    “8. It is thus obvious from the catena of decisions dealing with bail that even while clarifying that arrest should be the last option and it should be restricted to cases where arrest is imperative in the facts and circumstances of a case, the consistent view is that the grant of anticipatory bail shall be restricted to exceptional circumstances. In other words, the position is that the power to grant anticipatory bail under S.438, CrPC is an exceptional power and should be exercised only in exceptional cases and not as a matter of course. Its object is to ensure that a person should not be harassed or humiliated in order to satisfy the grudge or personal vendetta of the complainant. (See the decision of this Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. v. J.J.Mannan & Anr. , 2010 (1) SCC 679).”
    “24. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion by the Court depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious as th

      Click Here to Read the rest of this document
      1
      2
      3
      4
      5
      6
      7
      8
      9
      10
      11
      SupremeToday Portrait Ad
      supreme today icon
      whatsapp-icon Back to top