2024 Supreme(Online)(KER) 34772
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
P. G. Ajithkumar, J
SHAHABANATH – Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KERALA – Respondent
Crl.Rev.Pet 1450/2012
SRI.S.RAJEEV SRI.K.K.DHEERENDRAKRISHNAN
The notification of a children's court does not strip a Magistrate of jurisdiction to try offences against children; procedural errors alone do not invalidate judgments unless they result in a failure of justice.
Headnote:(A) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 397 and 401 – Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 – Section 25 – Children's Court notification – The appellate court set aside the trial court's convictions on the basis that the children's court had been notified, thus claiming loss of jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The court held that the trial court retained jurisdiction despite the notification, emphasizing the need for speedy trials and the principle that procedural errors should not invalidate judgments unless they result in a failure of justice. (Paras 2, 8, 10, 12) (B) Jurisdiction – The court clarified that the notification of a children's court does not inherently strip the Magistrate of jurisdiction to try offences against children, but rather indicates the preferred forum for such trials. (Paras 10, 12) (C) Procedural Fairness – The court reiterated that procedural irregularities that do not result in a failure of justice should not lead to the setting aside of a trial's judgment. (Paras 9, 12)
Facts of the case:
The revision petitions were filed by victims of sexual offences against children, challenging the appellate court's decision to set aside the trial court's convictions based on the notification of a children's court.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the trial court had not lost jurisdiction and that setting aside the judgments would cause undue delay and hardship to the victims. Issues: The main issues were whether the trial court lost jurisdiction upon the notification of a children's court and whether procedural errors warranted setting aside the trial court's judgments. Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the trial court retained jurisdiction despite the notification of a children's court, and procedural errors alone do not invalidate judgments unless they result in a failure of justice. Result: The appellate court's judgments were set aside, and the appeals were remitted for further proceedings.
O R D E R
The victims of the offence respectively in C.C.Nos.167, 212, 213, 214, 215 and 216 of 2007 on the files of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Nadapuram have filed these revision petitions invoking the provision of Sections 397 read 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Code). They challenge the common judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Vatakara in Crl.Appeal Nos.283, 284 285, 286, 287 and 288 of 2010 dated 27.04.2012, by which the judgments of conviction and the orders of sentence rendered by the learned Magistrate in the aforesaid calendar cases were set aside. The learned Sessions Judge remanded the matter to the trial court for a fresh trial in accordance with law.
2. The judgments of the trial court were set aside on the sole ground that before pronouncing the said judgments, 1492, 1493 and 1494 of 2012 children's court was notified under Section 25 of the Commissions for Protection for Child Rights Act, 2005 (for short “the Child Rights Act”). The petitioners would contend that having trial before the Magistrate already begun and the children's court notified for the purpose of speedy trial alone, the appellate court ought not to have set aside the judgments of the trial court.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the common 2nd respondent.
4. Common are the offences alleged in all the said cases. Offences under Section 354 , 377 and 506(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( IPC ) were the offences. The 2nd respondent was the common accused. The allegations were also similar. That, the 2nd respondent, on various days in 2007, subjected respective victims aged around 10 years to sexual assault, unnatural offence and put to threat. The 2nd respondent was their teacher in Std.IV.
1492, 1493 and 1494 of 2012
5. On the 2nd respondent denying the charge, the learned Magistrate commenced trial. Pending trial in all the cases, the Government of Kerala issued G.O.(P) No.22/2009/SWD dated 03.06.2009 notifying the Sessions Courts in the State as Children's’ Court for the purpose of Section 25 of the Child Rights Act. Trial was concluded thereafter and the proceedings terminated in the judgment of conviction dated 30.04.2010 in all the cases. The appellate court took the view that having the children's court being the specified court, been notified on 03.06.2009, the learned Magistrate lost jurisdiction and the cases should have been committed to the children's court, invoking the provisions of Section 323 of the Code. The decision of this Court in Abdul Aziz v. Circle Inspector of Police [2011 (4) KLT 1003]
was placed reliance on in that regard.
6. Section 25 of the Child Rights Act reads as follows:
“25. Children's Courts.- For the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences against children or of violation
1492, 1493 and 1494 of 2012 of child rights, the State Government may, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification, specify at least a court in the State or specify, for each district, a Court of Session to be a Children's Court to try the said offences:Provided that nothing in this section shall apply if-
(a) a Court of Session is already specified as a special court; or (b) a special court is already constituted, for such offences under any other law for the time being in force.”
7. The purpose of notifying children's courts was for the specific purpose of speedy trial of offences against children or of violation of child rights. Either in Section 25 or in any other provision in the Child Rights Act, no exclusivity for the children's court in the matter of trial of such offences has been created. Therefore, the question is by notification of children's court, whether an ordinary criminal court having jurisdiction to try an offence in terms of the first schedule to the Code, lost the jurisdiction altogether. A further question to be considered is, keeping in mind the purpose for which