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2017 Supreme(Online)(KER) 8038

HIGH COURT OF KERALA
A.HARIPRASAD, J
KANIYARAKATH ELIYAMMA – Appellant
Versus
PUNCHAL MANI – Respondent
RSA/98/2005



Advocates:
SRI.CIBI THOMAS, SRI.K.V.PAVITHRAN, SRI.M.P. JAYANANDAN

Validity of a gift deed determines title transfer; mere agreements without creating property interest do not invoke promissory estoppel.

Headnote:

Property - Title – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 54 - Court upheld gift deed validity; promissory estoppel not applicable as it did not create interest in property.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff sued for a permanent prohibitory injunction and later amended the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The plaintiff claimed to have received the property as a gift from his father, while the defendants claimed ownership via a prior agreement.

Finding of the Court:

The lower appellate court found that the plaintiff had valid title under a registered gift deed, and the principle of promissory estoppel, as claimed by the defendants, could not be applied without establishing an interest in the property.

Issues: Whether the principle of promissory estoppel was correctly dismissed by the lower appellate court given the alleged agreement and actions of the defendants.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that promissory estoppel could not apply as the defendants failed to prove any legal or equitable interest in the property arising from the claimed agreement.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower appellate court's decree.

JUDGMENT

Appeal at the instance of the defendants in a suit where divergent findings were made by the trial court and first appellate court. Suit was one for permanent prohibitory injunction. Later it was amended as one for declaration of title, recovery of possession and for injunction.

2. Plaint averments, in brief, are as follows: 1st defendant is the eldest sister of plaintiff. 2nd defendant is her husband. They, along with their children, are residing in a house situated in the plaint schedule property. Plaint schedule property originally belonged to Punchal Joseph, father of the plaintiff and 1st defendant. Joseph had gifted the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff as per Ext.A1 registered gift deed dated 17.08.1989. Plaintiff accepted the gift and took possession of the property. After acquisition of the property, he constructed a small building (shed) in the plaint schedule property with an intention to keep manure and agricultural implements. While so, the 1st defendant sought permission from the plaintiff to occupy the shed for her residential purpose, which was acceded to by the plaintiff. Hence, the defendants occupied the shed for their residence. Plaintiff cultivated coconut trees, pepper vines, rubber trees, etc. in the property. It was informed to the plaintiff one day that the defendants had cut and removed valuable trees from the plaint schedule property. Thereafter they started asserting right on the property. Hence the suit. In the suit, amendments were made incorporating reliefs for declaration and recovery of possession.

3. The defendants filed a joint written statement, opposing the plaint claim. According to them, they are the true owners of the property. They disputed identity of the property. It is contended that Joseph, father of the plaintiff and 1st defendant, had executed Ext.B1 agreement on 24.07.1987 in favour of the 1st defendant, agreeing to transfer 1.5 acres of land in her favour. According to them, Ext.A1 gift deed takes in that property as well. Plaintiff has not derived any title in respect of the property covered by Ext.B1. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed.

4. Substantial question of law framed at the time of admission is:

“Whether the lower appellate court is correct in law in finding that the principle of promissory estoppal is not applicable in this case even though there is Ext.B1 agreement and the defendants have acted upon it by constructing a house in the property effecting improvements in the property and have been residing in the house after taking possession of the property?”

5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants and the respondent/plaintiff.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial court correctly took a view that the suit is not maintainable for the reason that the plaintiff and his assignor (father of the plaintiff and 1st defendant) were estopped from raising a contention against Ext.B1. It is further contended that as per Ext.B1, a shed was constructed by the 1st defendant along with her husband (2nd defendant) and they are residing in the property. It is therefore contended that they have acted to their detriment on the basis of Ext.B1. Hence the 1st defendant's father was estopped from denying her right to possess the property. Lower appellate court did not find favour with this contention. The principles of promissory estoppal cannot be invoked in this case. Ext.B1 did not create any interest or charge in the property. This is clear from the provisions in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 . Further, it is the specific contention by the plaintiff that the shed in question was constructed by him expending money. In the absence of any reliable evidence to accept the contention of the 1st defendant that pursuant to Ext.B1 she acted to her detriment, the promissory estoppal theory propounded was correctly dispelled by the lower appellate court.

7. Another contention raised by the appellants is regarding non-

jo

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