ORDER

Petitioner is the accused in S.T.C No.411/2023 on the files of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Thalassery. The said proceedings were initiated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Petitioner challenges an order dated 19.07.2024, issued under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, directing the petitioner to pay an amount equivalent to 15% of the cheque amount, as interim compensation.

2. According to the petitioner, the proceedings in S.T.C No.411/2023 are almost ripe for trial. In the meantime, Crl.M.P No.3003/2024 was filed under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, by the complainant. An objection was filed by the accused. However, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, by the impugned order, after noticing that there is no dispute on the signature or any denial of ownership of the cheque and also noticing that the accused has pleaded not guilty, directed deposit of 15% of the cheque amount as interim compensation.

3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.

4. The statute was amended in 2018 and Section 143A was incorporated with a salutary purpose. The learned Magistrate is vested with the discretion to direct payment of an interim compensation. When such discretion is exercised by the learned Magistrate, unless it is exercised pervasively or the impugned order is totally erroneous, it is not proper for this Court to interfere with such an order, that too, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

5. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that sufÏcient reasons have been stated by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate while directing deposit under section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It is also noticed that the accused had not even issued a reply notice to the statutory notice issued by the complainant. Taking into consideration the aforesaid circumstances, I do not find any perversity in the impugned order.

6. Apart from the above, the apprehension of the accused that if the amount as directed is now paid and if ultimately he is acquitted, he will be put to serious prejudice, is not legally justified. The situation of that nature is taken care of by the statute itself through Section 143A(f)

wherein, the Court is entitled to direct return of the amount so paid. In such a view of the matter, I find no prejudice will also be caused to the petitioner.

In view of the above, I find no merit in this Crl.M.C, hence it is dismissed.