A teacher's reasonable use of force to enforce discipline does not constitute an offense under Sections 323, 341 of the Indian Penal Code, or Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection of Children Act 2015.

ORDER

Petitioner is the accused in Crime No.1437 of 2017 of Nooranadu Police Station, which is pending as C.C.No.710 of 2017 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Class Court-II, Mavelikkara was registered alleging commission of offences under Sections 323 and 341 of Indian Penal Code and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection of Children Act 2015.

2. The allegation against the petitioner is that while working as Hindi language teacher in a school, he assaulted a Class-X student of the school at about 4 p.m. on 09.11.2017. It is alleged that the petitioner had so assaulted the student for bending down and trying to pick up something at the time when the National Anthem was being played. It is alleged that the petitioner kicked the student as a result of which the student had fallen down and had thereafter dragged him by his shirt collar and had thrown him in to the southern corner of the class room.

The Crime came to be registered on the complaint of the father of the child/defacto complainant, who is arrayed as additional 2nd respondent to the Criminal M.C.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that there is absolutely no allegation which would attract the offence under Section 323 or Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that going by Annexure A3 wound certificate, absolutely no injury was reported by the child and therefore, the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC is not attracted. It is submitted that in definition of ‘hurt’ under Section 319 of the Indian Penal Code read with the definition of ‘voluntarily causing hurt’ in Section 321 of the Indian Penal Code will indicate beyond doubt that the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC is not attracted under the facts and circumstances of this case. Coming to the offence under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code, it is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even assuming that the entire allegation against the petitioner is accepted to be true, it cannot be said that the petitioner has committed the offence of wrongful restraint as defined in Section 339 of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that wrongful restraint is defined under Section 339 of the Indian Penal Code and is punishable under Section 341, only if there is an obstruction of a person to proceed in a direction in which that person has a right to proceed. It is submitted that even if the entire allegations are accepted as true, the offence of wrongful restraint as defined in Section 339 IPC is not attracted in the facts of the present case.

4. Coming to the offence under Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, it is case of the learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the judgment of this Court in Rajan @ Raju v. Sub Inspector of Police, Feroke Police Station and Others [2018 (5) KHC 967] that where the petitioner has acted purely for enforcing discipline and for that purpose has applied a reasonable degree of force, even if the allegations are true. It is submitted that in the facts of the present case, the petitioner allegedly assaulted the child when he found that the child was bending forward towards another child and trying to pick up something from the floor when he was required to stand in attention and pay respect to the rendering of the National Anthem. It is submitted that in such circumstances, it could not be said the petitioner has committed any of the offences alleged against him.

5. The learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent would submit that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. It is submitted that the question as to whether the petitioner had committed the offences punishable under Sections 323 or 341 of the Indian Penal Code as also the question as to whether the petitioner was acting only to enforce discipline for the purposes of deciding whether the offence under the Juvenile Justice Act was attracted or not, is clearly a matter for evidence a