A liberal application of 'sufficient cause' is necessary to prevent injustice to claimants in motor vehicle accident cases, especially when they trust their counsel for prosecution.

JUDGMENT

The original petition is filed to set aside the common order dated 05.10.2021 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Neyyattinkara (in short 'Tribunal') in I.A.Nos.4451/2019, 4452/2019, 3/2021 and 4/2021(Ext.P8) in O.P.(MV) No.178/2010.

2. The skeletal facts, relevant for the determination of the original petition, are: the petitioner is the applicant in the above claim petition, filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 , seeking compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- from the respondents, on account of the injuries sustained to the petitioner in an accident on 16.12.2005. The claim petition was dismissed on 24.04.2012 for non- prosecution. The petitioner had filed Ext.P2 application, to restore the claim petition, with Ext.P3 application, to condone the delay in filing Ext.P2 application. However, Exts.P2 and P3 applications were dismissed on 10.02.2014. Then, the petitioner filed Exts.P4 to P7 applications to restore Exts.P2 and P3 applications and to condone the delay in filing the subsequent applications. The Court below, by the impugned Ext.P8 order, dismissed Exts.P4 to P7. Ext.P8 is erroneous and wrong. The petitioner was a Maison. He is still suffering on account of the injuries sustained to him in the accident. He had entrusted the matter to an Advocate. He was under the bonafide belief that the claim petition was being diligently prosecuted by his counsel. The Court below, without considering the applications in its proper perspective, dismissed the applications by Ext.P8 common order.

Hence, the original petition.

3. Heard; Sri.R.V.Sreejith, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri.VPK.Panicker, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent. Service is complete on the 1st respondent. I have dispensed with notice to the 2nd respondent.

4. Sri. R.V.Sreejith argued that the Tribunal has on hyper technical grounds dismissed Exts.P2 to P7 applications. The Tribunal ought to have borne in mind that the claim petition was filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 , on account of the serious injuries sustained to the petitioner in a road accident. The petitioner had entrusted the matter to an Advocate in Neyyattinkara. He reposed full faith and confidence in his counsel and believed that the case would be properly contested. It is after coming to learn that the case was dismissed for default, that he filed Exts.P2 and P3 applications to restore the claim petition and to condone the delay of 519 days in filing the restoration petition. Subsequently, those applications were also dismissed. Thereafter Exts.P4 to P7 applications were filed, which were also wrongly dismissed. The learned counsel relied on the decision of this Court inKshemanidhi Kuries & Loans (P) Ltd. v. Ashokan [ 2008 (4) KLT 744 ] to fortify his contention that the expression “sufficient cause” is an adequately elastic term and has to be meaningfully applied by the Courts to subserve the ends of justice. He also placed reliance on the decision inIndian Oil Corporation Ltd. And Ors vs.Subrata Borah Chowlek and Ors. [ 2010 (14) SCC 419 ] to canvass the position that while construing “sufficient cause”, the Courts should take a liberal approach, particularly when there is no negligence, inaction or malafides against the litigant. He further drew the attention of this Court to the decision inRam Nath Sao Alia Ram Nath Sahu and Ors. vs. Gobardhan Sao and Ors. [ (2002) 3 SCC 195 ], wherein, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the Courts should not reject an application for restoration/setting aside the ex-parte decree in slipshod manner order, in the over- jubilation of disposal drive, and also should not take a pedantic and hyper technical view of the explanation furnished by the party and reject the application causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party. Instead, the Courts should strike a balance between the resultant effect of the order on the parties either way. He argued that the