Proper legal procedures must be followed according to the Public Premises Act prior to eviction; unauthorized occupation cannot simply be assumed upon expiry of a tenancy agreement.

Petitioners in each of these revisions are licensees in occupation of different shop rooms, all owned by the Cantonment Board. Each of them obtained the right from the Board directly or through the predecessors of the respective petitioners. According to the petitioners, on the basis of a license arrangement, on agreed terms, they or their predecessors were put in possession. The arrangement was styled as a license agreement by the Board. Petitioners have been regularly paying the consideration every month as agreed. According to the petitioners, they are conducting different businesses or trade in the above shop rooms and are exclusively depending on the income generated from such businesses, for their livelihood. The first respondent is the CEO of the Cantonment Board and the second respondent is the Cantonment Board, represented by its CEO.

2. According to the petitioners, first respondent, immediately after taking charge as the CEO, unilaterally decided to evict all the occupants from their respective rooms. Accordingly, he issued order dated 05.04.2017, stating that the period of arrangement has expired and directed each of the petitioners to surrender the respective rooms within 30 days. As an afterthought, another letter dated 11.04.2017 revoking the earlier notice was issued and informed them that the Board had resolved to revoke the decision and decided to extent the period of arrangement for three years, retrospectively from 01.04.2015. Contending that the above notices were issued with malafide motive, petitioners filed W.P(C).No.14983 of 2017 and W.P(C).No.14810 of 2017 to quash all the notices issued to them. The writ petitions were disposed of by this Court recording the undertaking of first and second respondents that the arrangement with the petitioners would not be disturbed till 31.03.2018. Though a writ appeal was filed by the petitioners, it was permitted to be withdrawn, enabling them to file writ petitions on fresh cause of action.

3. According to the petitioners, subsequently, they came to know that, hasty steps were being taken to forcefully evict them. Accordingly, they filed W.P(C).No.11140 of 2018 before this Court. It was disposed of with a direction that the petitioners shall not be evicted otherwise than by due process of law.

4. While so, all the revision petitioners received letters dated

06.04.2018 issued by the first respondent claiming himself to be the Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1971 (hereinafter referred as the 'Public Premises Act'), invoking sections 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. By the above communication, petitioners were requested to show cause before 20.04.2018 as to why the order of eviction shall not be passed. Separate replies were sent by the petitioners objecting to the eviction proceedings. Personal hearing was given to the petitioners, wherein, they submitted written representations. Thereafter, order dated 15.05.2018 of the first respondent, Estate Officer was served on the petitioners. It was held that, they were in unauthorized occupation and were directed to vacate the respective shop rooms on or before

06.06.2018.

5. Contending that the notices issued were illegal, arbitrary and without considering the objections raised by them in their representations and further that, they were not issued with notices under the Public Premises Act, they challenged the order dated 15.05.2018 before the District Court, Kannur, under section 9(1) of the Public Premises Act. All the CMAs were heard and by a common order, appeals were dismissed. Separate revisions have been filed by each of the appellant, challenging the common judgment in appeal.

6. The above revisions were heard and by a common order dated 17.12.2019 in all the cases, this Court allowed the revisions and set aside the impugned orders, essentially on a premise that the authority to pass the order was not clothed with powers under Section 2(f) of the Public Premi