The enforceability of marriage contracts is upheld, and damage assessments should aim to restore the plaintiff to their pre-breach position without penalizing the defendant beyond their due compensation.

JUDGMENT

This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram, in A.S.No.250/2002, which arose from the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judges Court, Nedumangad in O.S.No.49/1998. The plaintiff in the trial Court is the appellant and defendants 1 and 2 are the respondents.

2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are extracted below:

2.1. The plaintiff and the defendants belong in Ezhava community. On 29.01.1998, the plaintiff, the defendants and their relatives assembled in the defendants' residence and agreed to conduct plaintiff's marriage with defendant No.1 as per religious rites and customs prevailing in their community. They decided to conduct the marriage on 17.08.1998. The betrothal ceremony was held on 29.01.1998. Thereafter the defendants withdrew from the agreement raising the allegation that the plaintiff had illicit relations with another lady. The plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss as well as mental agony due to the conduct of the defendants.

2.2. The defendants resisted the claim of the plaintiff. They admitted that they agreed to solemnize the marriage. They were made to believe that the plaintiff was aged only 25 years and that he was highly educated. After the betrothal ceremony, it was revealed that the plaintiff had not possessed the qualification as claimed and he was 12 years elder than defendant No.1. The plaintiff had an illicit connection with another lady and he was leading a loose life. Defendant No.1 never consented to the marriage between the plaintiff and herself. The plaintiff has not sustained any damages as claimed.

3. The trial Court framed the following issues:

“1. Whether there was a concluded and enforceable contract?

2. Whether the specific performance of agreement or the damages claimed as alternative prayer are allowable?

3. Whether the injunction prayed for is allowable

4. Reliefs and costs?”

4. The evidence consists of the oral evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and DW1; Exts. A1 to A13 were marked on the side of the plaintiff.

Ext.X1 was also marked.

5. The trial Court held that there was a concluded contract between the plaintiff and the defendants and that the defendants had withdrawn from the contract. It was further held that the defendants are liable to pay compensation for the loss sustained by the plaintiff.

6. The trial Court decreed the suit granting a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards mental agony suffered by the plaintiff and a sum of Rs.5,000/- towards pecuniary loss suffered by him.

7. The defendants challenged the judgment and decree of the trial Court before the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram, in A.S. No.250/2002.

8. The First Appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court that there was a concluded contract between the plaintiff and the defendants and the defendants are liable to pay compensation for the loss sustained by the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court also confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the defendants caused damage to the plaintiff's reputation. Accordingly, the Court interfered with the quantum of damages awarded by the trial Court and granted a sum of Rs.5,000/- towards pecuniary damages, taking into account the expenses incurred by the plaintiff, and a further sum of Rs.5,000/- as compensation towards mental agony to the plaintiff.

9. Aggrieved by the judgment of the First Appellate Court reducing the amount of compensation awarded to the plaintiff towards the mental agony, the plaintiff has come up before this Court by filing this Regular Second Appeal.

10. After hearing both sides and perusal of the materials placed, this Court reformulated the substantial question of law as:-

i) Did not the lower appellate court act contrary to law in reducing the compensation for mental agony?

11. Heard Sri.Shinod G.P., the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.G.Biju, the learned counsel for the respondents.

12. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that it was illegal on the part