Insults to modesty under IPC must demonstrate clear intent and sexual connotation; mere allegations are insufficient for prosecution.

ORDER

The petitioner is the accused in CC No.944/2023 on the files of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Mattannur. The offence alleged against him is under Section 509 IPC .

2. The prosecution case is that on 05.04.2023 at about 6 pm, while the de facto complainant, against whom the accused was earlier alleged to have committed offence under the provisions of PoCSO Act, was going through a public road, the accused showed a gesture by spitting into the road and commenting that ‘is she not the one who instituted false case against me.’ Thus, the petitioner/accused is alleged to have committed the aforesaid offence. The case has been registered by the Ulikkal Police, on the basis of the complaint preferred by the mother of the aggrieved person in this crime. After the completion of the investigation, the Inspector of Police, Ulikkal, laid the Final Report.

3. In the present petition, the petitioner would contend that he is totally innocent, and that he has been falsely implicated in this case. It is further stated that the allegations levelled against the petitioner, even if accepted as such, will not constitute the offence under Section 509 IPC . 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for the de facto complainant and the learned Public Prosecutor representing the State of Kerala.

5. Section 509 IPC reads as follows:

509. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman.

Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine.

6. Going by the aforesaid Section, the cardinal requirement to be fulfilled for a successful prosecution against the accused for the commission of offence under the said Section is that there should be insult to the modesty of a woman by way of any word, gesture, sound or by way of exhibiting any object. As regards the scope and applicability of the term modesty, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka [(2025) 3 SCC 612] as follows:

“27. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509 IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning of the term “modesty”, to determine whether modesty has been insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in , this Court has addressed the essence of a woman's modesty in the decision in Ramkripal v. State of M.P. [ Ramkripal v. State of M.P. , (2007) 11 SCC 265 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 674] Excerpts from the decision read as under : (SCC pp.

266-67, para 7)

“7. … ‘12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined in IPC . The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex.’”

(emphasis supplied)

28. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 509 IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill , (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri)

1059] , observed as under : (SCC p. 206, para 15) “15. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh [ State of Punjab v. Major Singh , 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] a question arose whether a female child of seven-and-a-half months could be said to be possessed of “modesty” which could be outraged. In answering the above question Mudholkar, J., who along with Bachawat, J. spoke for the majority, held that when any act