Procedural rules restrict amendments to pleadings post-commencement of trial to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process.

JUDGMENT DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN (J)

The petitioner challenges Ext.P6 order of the learned Family Court, Alappuzha, which dismissed I.A.No.2/2024 seeking amendment of O.P.No.1350/2022 - which had been filed by her against the respondents.

2. The petitioner attempted to introduce the word “respondents”, instead of the words “1^st respondent”, in the first line of paragraph No.14 of Ext.P1 Original Petition; and she asserted that it was only an inadvertent omission because she had already averred in paragraph 4 thereof that her gold and patrimony had been entrusted by her to all the respondents together.

3. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri.Suresh Joseph admits that his client had filed proof affidavit - a copy of which is on record as Ext.P3, wherein, she has specifically averred that all the respondents have misappropriated her gold ornaments. He thus prayed that the impugned order be set aside since, it has been incorrectly found the amendments to be untenable for want of factual foundation, though the same is evidently available in the pleadings.

4. In response, the learned counsel for the respondents – Sri.C.J.Varghese Vinu, submitted that, apart from what the learned Family Court has recorded, there is a more pertinent issue involved, namely that the petitioner had been cross examined as PW1 - based on Ext.P3 proof affidavit; and that she admitted that she had not pleaded in her Original Petition that her gold had been misappropriated “by all the respondents”. He added that this admission is now being tried to be covered through an amendment of the Original Petition, after the trial had begun; and argued that hence the learned Family Court has acted without error in issuing the impugned order, particularly because Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandates that any amendment after commencement of trial be only allowed in exceptional circumstances. He thus prayed that this Original Petition be dismissed.

5. There is force in the afore submission of the learned counsel for the respondents because, had it been a case where an amendment was sought before the trial had begun, we may have considered the application very liberally, as is necessary for us to do under the established principles of law; but, when it comes to an amendment sought after the trial starts, it is ineluctable that Courts are to be very circumspect.

6. In this case, though her proof affidavit carries averments that the gold of the petitioner had been misappropriated by all the respondents, when she was examined as PW1, her deposition admitted to be as under:

“

᪚➌ീധന്ᩈിᩙ᪓(cid:8) പേ(cid:10)രിൽ എതൃക്ᩌികൾ (cid:10)ീഡി്ᩔി്ᨴ കാര്യം

.

ഹർജിയിൽ എഴുതിയി്ᨾിᩙ᪓(cid:31)്ᨮിൽ വിᨾ᪎പേ(cid:10)ായിരി്ᨪാം എതൃക്ᩌികൾ സ്വർ്ᩆാഭരണം അവരുᩙ᪓+ ആവശ്യ്ᩈിന് ഉ(cid:10)പേയാഗി്ᨴതായി ഹർജിയിൽ . 2,3 misappropriate എഴുതിയി്ᨾി(cid:31) എതൃക്ᩌികൾ തുക ᩙ᪓2ᩓ᪎

“.

എ്ᩐ് ഹർജിയിൽ (cid:10)റ്ᨼി്ᨾി(cid:31)

7. The learned counsel for the respondents assert that this admission by PW1 cannot be allowed to be got over, by expost facto amendment of the claim.

8. Though we do not propose to enter into the merits of the rival contentions, particularly as to the impact of the testimony vis-a-vis the pleadings on record, we are certain that, after the trial starts, an amendment intended to get over admissions in testimony cannot be allowed.