2025 Supreme(Online)(Ker) 49730
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
V. G. Arun, J
VIJAYAN M.T – Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KERALA – Respondent
CRL.MC NO. 9651 OF 2023 | SC NO.1453 OF 2023
For the Appellants/Petitioners: SMT.P.MAYA, SMT.M.M.DEEPA, SMT.ASWATHY VIJAYAKUMAR, SMT.N.SUDHA
For the Respondents: SRI. M.C. ASHI, SR.PP.
The court rules that acquittal from harbouring charges requires evidence of intent to conceal an offender, which was lacking due to police surveillance.
Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 212 - Harbouring an offender - Petitioners, accused of harbouring an individual who was involved in a serious crime, were found not liable as the individual was under police surveillance. The court ruled that mere permission to reside does not constitute concealment or harbouring. (Paras 2, 4, 5)
(B) Harbouring Offender - Essential ingredient for Section 212 requires intention to screen an offender from legal punishment. The petitioners' actions, given the police oversight, did not meet this threshold. (Paras 3, 4)
Facts of the case:
Petitioners were accused of harbouring the 1st accused involved in an assault after sustaining injuries themselves. The prosecution's stance relying on police surveillance was insufficient to establish the charge of harbouring.
Findings of Court:
The court quashed all proceedings against the petitioners under the allegation of Section 212, citing the lack of evidence to fulfill legal criteria of concealment.
Issues: The key questions revolved around the definition of harbouring and the presence of police surveillance.
Ratio Decidendi: The court clarified that for Section 212 to apply, intent to hide the offender must be proven, which was lacking in this case.
Result: Crl.M.C allowed.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. essential facts of the case and the charges under review. (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence for harbouring. (Para 3 , 4) |
| 3. court’s conclusion on the legal definitions and implications. (Para 5) |
ORDER
Dated this the 20th day of August, 2025 The petitioners are accused Nos.4 and 5 in S.C. No.1453 of 2023 pending on the files of the Assistant Sessions Court, Muvattupuzha, wherein they are facing prosecution for the charge under Section
212 of IPC . The essential facts are as under;
On 15.02.2023, the 1st accused allegedly trespassed into the courtyard of the defacto complainant’s house and inflicted serious injuries on his head and forehead. The crime was therefore registered against the 1st accused and two others for offences under Sections 341, 323, 324, 294(b) and 307 r/w Section 34 of IPC . The petitioners were arraigned as accused Nos.4 and 5 in the final report on the allegation that they had harboured the 1st accused in the house of the 1st petitioner with the knowledge that the 1st accused is an accused in a serious crime.
2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the allegation regarding commission of the offence under Section 212 of IPC by the petitioners is baseless, since the materials produced by the prosecution, even if accepted in their entirety, is not sufficient to attract the offence. Referring to the remand report filed in the case of the 2nd accused, it is submitted that the 1st accused had also suffered serious injuries in the alleged incident and was admitted in the Taluk Hospital, Kothamangalam, from where he was referred to Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, and treated there as an inpatient. Through out his treatment and even thereafter, the 1st accused was under police surveillance. In the meanwhile, the
1st accused moved an application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court, Muvattupuzha and on dismissal of that application, approached the High Court. Therein, the 1st accused was granted interim bail by this Court on 09.05.2023 and the bail was confirmed as per Annexure C order dated 30.6.2023, since the petitioners had, in the meanwhile, surrendered before the Investigating Officer, and was released on bail after interrogation. The 1st accused had resided in the 1st petitioner’s house, during the interregnum between his discharge from the hospital and grant of anticipatory bail by this Court. Such residence, by itself, is not sufficient to attract the offence under Section 212 of IPC , the police version being that all throughout the 1st accused was under their surveillance.
3. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, merely by reason of the police having stated that the 1st accused was under their surveillance, it cannot be inferred that all through out the 1st accused was under police surveillance and the 1st petitioner had not harboured the 1st accused by permitting him to reside in the house. It is pointed out that the 1st accused had suffered grievous injuries and coupled with his antecedents, the only possible assumption is that the petitioners had harboured the 1st accused, in spite of their knowledge that he was involved in a serious crime.
4. The essential ingredient for attracting the offence under Section 212 is harbouring or concealing the offender, in spite of knowing or having reason to believe that such person is the offender. Further, the concealment of harbouring should be with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. As far as the case at hand is concerned, it is not in dispute that the 1st accused had suffered serious injuries in the incident and was hospitalised for some period. The question therefore whether the petitioners had willfully concealed or harboured the 1st accused after his discharge from the hospital. Here, it is pertinent to note that in the remand report dated 16.02.2023 filed by the Investigating Officer while producing the 2nd accused, specific averment is that the 1st ac