A court will not entertain an amendment from a litigant acting in bad faith and attempting to rectify a substantial delay in claiming fraudulent actions.

JUDGMENT

The plaintiff came up with a suit for injunction in the year 2015, suppressing the execution of an earlier sale deed of the year 1970, Ext.P2, with respect to the plaint schedule in favour of the predecessor in interest of the first defendant. When it was brought up by the first defendant, the plaintiff came up with an application for amendment for incorporating a prayer to set aside the said document on the ground of fraud, which was later on not pressed into service, presumably for getting an ex parte decree on account of absence of the defendant in the suit and thereby obtained an ex parte decree for permanent prohibitory injunction. But, it was subsequently set aside at the instance of the defendants. At that time, a second application, Ext.P5, was submitted, to which Ext.P6 objection was raised, but that application was also not pressed into service and ended in dismissal. Thereon, Ext.P7 application, a third application, was filed for the very same purpose for incorporating the very same relief by way of amendment, to which Ext.P8 objection was submitted, which was ended in Ext.P9 order. Strange enough, the amendment was allowed by the trial court by applying the doctrine of relation back and reserving the question of limitation. But it is a case wherein the plaintiff initially came up with unclean hands for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction suppressing the execution of a deed of conveyance of the year 1972, Ext.P2, in favour of the predecessor in interest of the defendants and when it was brought up, an amendment sought to be incorporated, that too after the lapse of more than 45 years, for setting aside the document on the ground of fraud. The learned counsel for the respondent gone up to the extent of stating that, as far as ‘fraud’ is concerned, there cannot be any question of limitation. The plaintiff did not have any case that the document, the sale deed, is not the one executed or signed by him. It is a sale deed of the year 1970. So the notice of the execution would start from the date of its execution and registration. The court shall not be an instrumentality in the hands of an unscrupulous litigant who came up with a suit for injunction by suppressing documentation, a deed of transfer, executed in the year 1970 in favour of the predecessor in interest of the first defendant. The suit ought to have been dismissed at the threshold by ordering exemplary cost and an amendment sought also liable to be dismissed at the threshold with cost of the respondents. It is not a case wherein the amendment can be allowed with a reservation of the limitation when it come to more or less 45 years. Necessarily, Ext.P9 order cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside by exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. I do so. The amendment application will stand dismissed. The trial court shall take up maintainability of suit and the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue before proceeding further in the matter.

The original petition will stand allowed accordingly.