Lack of intention to fulfill a marriage promise at the inception is crucial in distinguishing between consensual relations and rape under IPC.

ORDER

Dated : 26^th November, 2025 The petitioner is the sole accused in S.C.455/2023 on the file of the Special Court for SC/ST (PoA) Act Cases, Manjeri. The offences alleged against the petitioner are under Sections 366 , 376(2)(n), 201 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code , Section 66 (E) of the IT Act and Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2) (v) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

2. The prosecution case is that the accused who is not a member of the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe made contact with CW1 who is a member of the schedule caste community and on one day in May, 2017 took her in a motor cycle to his residence and committed rape upon her after promising to marry her. Thereafter, he took her to the residence of his elder brother at Pothanur in Tamil Nadu on several days and committed rape upon her. In 2018, while he was abroad, he obtained her nude photographs and videos and intimidated her with those photographs and videos and thereafter refused to marry her. It is also alleged that he failed to cooperate with the investigating officer in finding out the motor cycle used for the commission of the offences.

3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, even as per the averments in the FI statement, the relationship between the petitioner and the defacto complainant was a consensual one and hence the same does not constitute the offence of rape as alleged by the prosecution. Therefore, he prayed for quashing all further proceedings against the petitioner.

4. The petition was strongly opposed by the learned Public Prosecutor.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inNaim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), MANU/SC/0080/2023, would argue that, unless there is evidence to show that at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever of keeping his promise to marry the victim, the offence under Section 376 IPC will not be attracted. In the above decision, referring to the earlier decision in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana , (2013) 7 SCC 675 , in paragraph 16 the Apex Court held that:

“Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of mis-representation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

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24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time