2025 Supreme(Online)(Ker) 54729
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
A. Muhamed Mustaque, HARISANKAR V. MENON, JJ
SUMA MOHANAN – Appellant
Versus
V.P. VARUNNY (DIED) – Respondent
RCREV. NO. 254 OF 2025
For the Appellants/Petitioners: SHRI.M.S.UNNIKRISHNAN, SRI.AADITYA NAIR, SMT.M.ARDRA KRISHNAN, SHRI.SOHAN VARGHESE FRANCIS, SMT.ANUSREE B., SMT.RESHMA K.
For the Respondents: SRI.BIJO FRANCIS, SRI.JOSE KURIAKOSE (VILANGATTIL), SRI.LUIZ GODWIN D COUTH
The court ruled that specific details of rent arrears must be included in eviction notices under the Rent Control Act; otherwise, eviction orders are unsustainable.
Headnote:In this case, the tenant, represented by the revision petitioner, challenges an eviction order issued under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 for non-payment of rent. The court determined that the notice for arrears lacked specificity, rendering the order under Section 11(2)(b) unsustainable, leading to its annulment. Furthermore, the tenant's claims regarding alternative accommodations provided by the landlord's son were dispelled due to insufficient evidence. Ultimately, the court confirmed the eviction under Section 11(3), deeming the landlord's need genuine. The tenant is granted six months' time to vacate the premises while ensuring payment of outstanding rent.
| Table of Content |
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| 1. tenant challenges eviction notice based on lack of specificity in rent arrears. (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. landlord's need for eviction deemed genuine; tenant failed to prove alternative accommodations. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6) |
| 3. court grants tenant six months to vacate while ensuring payment of arrears. (Para 7) |
A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.
This matter has come up for admission today. Notice has been issued to the respondents. The tenant is the revision petitioner. The tenant challenges the concurrent findings under Sections 11 (2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act , 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
2. The tenant contends that the order under Section
11(2)(b) of the Act is illegal inasmuch as there is no specific mention of the month from which the rent fell into arrears or of the date of default. It is therefore submitted that, in the absence of any default attributable to the tenant, no order of eviction under Section 11 (2)(b) of the Act could have been passed.
3. The learned counsel for the landlord submitted that, in the notice, it is specifically stated that the rent has been in arrears since 2014, and while adducing evidence, it was clearly mentioned that the default commenced from November 2014.
4. We find that the jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 11 (2)(b) of the Act would arises only when the tenant fails to clear the arrears of rent as demanded in the notice preceding the filing of the petition. If no specific details regarding the default are mentioned in the notice, the Court cannot determine those particulars during the trial. With respect to the rent arrears, the notice must specify the exact date from which the tenant has defaulted in payment. In the absence of a specific mention of the date of default, an order of eviction under (2)(b) of the Act cannot be sustained. Therefore, we set aside the order passed under (2)(b) of the Act.
5. With respect to Section 11 (3) of the Act, the original landlord projected a bona fide requirement for his son to start an ice cream shop and bakery. The original landlord-respondent No.1 died and his legal heirs are arrayed as respondent Nos.2 to 5. The son was examined as PW2. It has been found that the need is genuine and bona fide.
6. The tenant contends that the landlord’s son has shop rooms in the Casino Complex and, therefore, the claim for eviction is hit by the first proviso to Section 11 (3) of the Act. It is to be noted that the tenant was unable to prove that any vacant buildings were available with the landlord or his son at the time of filing the petition. Merely because the landlord or his son was in possession of other rooms will not disentitle them from seeking eviction under (3) of the Act. The first proviso would come into play only when the landlord is found to be in possession of a suitable building to start the proposed business. The burden would then shift to the landlord to explain the reasons for not occupying that building. In the absence of any evidence adduced by the tenant to show that there were vacant buildings available with the landlord, the eviction petition cannot be said to be hit by the first proviso to (3) of the Act. The tenant has also failed to invoke the protection available under the second proviso to (3).
7. In the light of the above, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction under Section 11 (3) of the Act. The revision petition is therefore allowed in part, setting aside the order under (2)(b) of the Act and confirming the order under (3) of the Act. We grant the tenant six months' time from today to vacate the building, subject to the following terms and conditions:
(1) The tenant shall undertake that she will vacate the building within six months from today. She shall file an undertaking within four weeks from today.
(2) She shall pay the entire arrears within the above time and shall continue to pay the rent due till the date of delivery.
We m