2025 Supreme(Online)(Ker) 55114
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
K. BABU, J
GAJENDRA BABU – Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KERALA – Respondent
BAIL APPL. NO. 13778 OF 2025 | CRIME NO.587/2024
For the Appellants/Petitioners: SRI.S.RAJEEV, SRI.V.VINAY, SRI.M.S.ANEER, SHRI.SARATH K.P., SMT.DIPA V., SHRI.ANILKUMAR C.R., SHRI.K.S.KIRAN KRISHNAN, SHRI.AKASH CHERIAN THOMAS, SHRI.AZAD SUNIL, SHRI.C.N.PRAKASH
For the Respondents: SRI. SANAL P RAJ, PP
The determination of anticipatory bail must consider the seriousness of the charges and the accused's likelihood to tamper with evidence or flee.
Headnote:This bail application concerns the petitioner accused of several offenses under the IPC, involving alleged fraud. The Court found a prima facie case allowing bail under Section 482 of the BNSS, 2023. The judgment discusses considerations for anticipatory bail, emphasizing the importance of personal freedom and the presumption of innocence. The petitioner must report for interrogation and comply with conditions attached to the bail order.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. allegations of fraud involving monetary transactions. (Para 2 , 3) |
| 2. petitioner's claims of innocence and business transactions. (Para 5 , 6) |
| 3. judicial principles surrounding anticipatory bail determination. (Para 7 , 9 , 10) |
| 4. bail granted with specific conditions. (Para 11) |
K.BABU, J.
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B.A No.13778 of 2025 ---------------------------------------
Dated this the 5th day of December, 2025 O R D E R This is an application filed under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita ( BNSS ), 2023.
2. The petitioner is accused No.5 in Crime No.587/2024 of Aloor Police Station. The offences alleged against the petitioner are punishable under Section s 406 , 420, 464, 471, 295, 295(A), 379, 506 r/w Section 34 of the IPC .
3. The prosecution case as narrated from Anx.IV order reads thus:
“During the period from 10.04.2023 to 01.11.2023 on different occasions, with fraudulent intention to deceive the the defacto complainant, accused No.5 (petitioner herein) fraudulently obtained a sum of Rs.57,50,000/- from the de-facto complainant and he also received an amount of Rs.17,00,000/ through his account in Maruthi Enterprises at Bangalore,1st accused received Rs.30,70,000/- and transferred the same to the financial institution in the ownership of 2nd , 3rd and 4th accused who are the relatives of the 1st accused without the knowledge of the de-facto complainant on a false promise that the de-facto complainant will be inducted as a partner in their business (granite crusher unit at Perisandra in Bangalore). The 1st accused who has no investment in the business colluded with the 5th accused, during the period from 04.09.2023 to 06.09.2023 transferred an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- through his DLB Bank Account with an intention to deceive the de-facto complainant and her daughter. But te accused deceived them by not giving the share in the business or give the amount back.(sic)”
4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Public Prosecutor.
5. The case of the petitioner is that he has no acquaintance with the defacto complainant. It is further contended that the petitioner received the amount towards business transaction and not as stated in the FIS. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that accused Nos.2 to 4 were granted anticipatory bail by this Court.
6. The learned Public Prosecutor opposed the bail plea of the petitioner.
7. I have gone through the Case Diary. The petitioner has established a prima facie case for getting the benefits contained in Section 482 of the BNSS .
8. While considering the scope of jurisdiction under Section
438 Cr.P.C., the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. v. State of Punjab [(1980) 2 SCC 565] held thus:
“31. In regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. On the other hand, if it appears likely, considering the antecedents of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. But the converse of these propositions is not necessarily true. That is to say, it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides; and, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. There are several other considerations, too numerous to enumerate, the combined effect of which must weigh with the court while granting or rejecting anticipatory bail. The nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of