A written contract's terms cannot be contradicted by oral agreements, as established in the Evidence Act's provisions.

1The defendant company is the appellant. The suit in the court below was for damages for alleged breach of two contracts for the supply of tea. The plaintiff is a dealer in tea, doing business at Quilon and the defendant company had charge of a tea estate which belonged to the Highland Produce Co. Ltd. The defendant company acted as agents and secretaries of this tea estate.

2The suit is based upon an alleged breach of two distinct contracts relating to two kinds of dust tea. The first was called Pasuppara A Dust and the second Pasuppara No. 2 Dust. The contract with regard to the second quality of goods was Ext. A which was entered into on 4.8.1941. The Trial Court has found that there was no breach relating to this contract and has dismissed the plaintiffs claim arising from this contract. Plaintiff has not appealed.

3With regard to the contract in respect of Pasuppara A Dust the Court below has found in favour of the plaintiff and has passed a decree for Rs. 44674-7-8 as damages for breach of the contract. It is from this decision that the present appeal is brought on behalf of the defendant company.

4The contract in respect of this quality of goods was entered into on 17.12.1941 and it was marked as Ext. M at the trial. It related to the supply of tea during the year 1942. According to the plaintiff, under this contract the defendant appellant was bound to supply a minimum of 20,000 pounds of tea dust every month. These terms the defendant did not carry out. There was deficiency to the extent of 1,17,000 pounds. The plaintiff claimed damages on the basis of loss of profit in respect of the quantity which was short-supplied.

5The suit was filed in Quilon. According to the defendant appellants learned counsel the court in Quilon had no jurisdiction because the contract was for the supply of goods at Alleppey. But it is seen from the judgment of the court below and also from the evidence that as a matter of fact supply was made at Quilon and in the circumstances the question regarding jurisdiction is not seriously pressed, especially in view of the fact that it cannot be said that any damage was sustained by the defendant because of the suit having been filed in the court in Quilon.

6The arguments of learned counsel on both sides turned upon the terms of the said contract, Ext. M. This contract is silent as to the quantity to be supplied every month. On behalf of the defendant it is contended that in view of the provisions of S.91 of the Evidence Act according to which when a contract is reduced to writing oral evidence about its terms cannot be given and the document is the only evidence that can be relied upon by the party who wishes to prove its terms, the court below erred in permitting the plaintiff to give oral evidence which he was precluded from doing under this section. That is the main point for decision in this appeal.

7The contention of the appellants learned counsel is that in the evidence given by the plaintiff he has stated in unequivocal terms that the oral conversation regarding the terms of the contract took place before the contract was reduced to writing in the form of Ext. M. But he stated further in his evidence that there is an assurance given about the minimum supply to be made every month. The terms of the contract are to the effect that the whole produce of the estate coming under the category of the quality of goods described in Ext. M should be supplied by the defendant to the plaintiff subject to certain reservations made in favour of the defendant. For example, there is a provision, according to which the defendant could supply to others tea that was not reduced to tea dust but was retained in the shape of tea leaves. The quantity thus excluded from the scope of the contract was left to the discretion of the defendant company. There is also a provision that the defendant could supply a definite quantity of goods to persons outside the State within the territory of which the contract was entered into. T