Temporary permits under the Motor Vehicles Act can be granted without full procedural compliance when justified by urgent need, as established under S.62.

1 By Ex. R2 dated 6-2-1969, the 2nd respondent Regional Transport Authority (the RTA. for short) directed the issue of a temporary permit for a period of four months to the appellant, who was not an operator on the particular route, under S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act overruling the objections of five operators on the route. A permit was issued on 11-2-1969, and the appellant commenced operation the very next day.

2 A person who has opposed the grant of a permit has a right of appeal under clause (f) of S.64 of the Act, and, ordinarily, that would be an impediment to his coming direct to this Court with an application under Art.226 of the Constitution. The Ist respondent, an operator on the route, was under no such disability, for, he had not appeared before the R.T.A. or otherwise opposed the grant to the appellant, although his father was one of the five operators who had. He came to this Court with an application under Art.226 of the Constitution for quashing the grant. That has been allowed by the learned single judge who heard the case. Hence this appeal.

3 The grounds urged by the 1st respondent for quashing the grant (omitting those which have not been urged before us) were:
(1) that the RTA. issued no manner of notice before granting the permit so "as to enable persons like the 1st respondent to make representations as they are entitled to do under sub-s.(1) of S.47 of the Act;
(2) that there was breach of R.177(2) of the Kerala Motor Vehicles' Rules made under the Act;
(3) That the proceedings of the RTA. were vitiated by mala fides; and
(4) that there was no temporary need within the meaning of clause (c) of S.62 of the Act under which the grant was made and no material whatsoever on which a finding of such a need could be based.
The learned single judge has found in favour of the 1st respondent on all these points; but, it seems to us that he has primarily based his decision on the ground of mala fides, his findings on points (1) and (2) being used as circumstances in support thereof, not as by themselves vitiating the grant, and his conclusion on point (4) resting largely on his finding of mala fides.

4 If mala fides are out of the way we do not think that there is any ground for interference in this case. The impugned order, Ex. R2, though brief, clearly shows that the RTA. did apply its mind to the requirements of S.62 of the Act, and it seems to us that it had ample material before it to reach the conclusion it did. On 21-1-1969, the R. T. A. considered written representation received frown certain quarters, including local bodies and educational institutions of the area concerned, asking for an additional service on the route and it decided to take up the question whether there was a permanent need for such a service. It issued and published a notification purporting to be under S.47 of the Act that section, in fact, contemplates no such notification to the effect that there was a proposal to introduce an additional ''pucca" service on the route and stating that any person wishing to make any representation in the matter should do so within 15 days. It also ordered the Motor Vehicles Inspector to make enquiries and report urgently as to the necessity of the proposed additional service. On 27-1-1969, the Motor Vehicles Inspector reported that there was permanent need for such a service meanwhile on 24-1-1969 the 1st respondent had applied for a temporary permit on the route. This application came up for consideration before the R. T. A. at its meeting held on 6-2-1969, and, after hearing the representations made by the five objectors already referred to, it made the impugned order Ex. R2 in the following terms:
"Heard the applicant & objectors. Temporary necessity felt till pucca service is introduced for which action has been taken. T. P. sanctioned".
The action referred to as taken is respect of a pucca service was apparently the publication purported to be made under S.47; however, it is apparent from Ex. R2 that, b