A claim is barred by limitation when there is no written acknowledgment or sufficient evidence supporting the plea for extension within the limitation period.

1The simple question for consideration in this appeal filed by the defendant against a money decree is whether the claim is barred by limitation.

2 Exts. A1 to A3 are the three orders placed by the respondent on 29-3-1974, 4-4-1974 and 28-8-1974 for fabrication and errection of tanks and fabrication and supply of trusses. The fourth one is for rectification of the defects of a transformer. The total claim was for Rs. 1,96,743.80. As on 8-10-1977, respondent claimed Rs. 66,443.80 after deducting receipts. Ext. A4 (a) is the statement of accounts sent along with Ext. A4 letter to that effect. Thereafter, the appellant paid Rs. 20,000.00 on 4-4-1978 and Rs. 22,000.00 on 14-8-1979. Balance claim is Rs. 24,443.80. Suit was filed on 8-10-1980.

3 No acknowledgment is pleaded in the plaint for saving limitation. Dates of cause of action mentioned in the plaint are those of Exts. A1 to A3 in 1974, the date of demand in 1976 and the date of payments in 1978 and 1979. The dispute is whether Art.18 or 26 of the Limitation Act will apply. Relying on the decisions in Bulakhidas Marwari v. Ganpatrao and another (AIR 1946 Nagpur.112) Gordon Woodroffe and Co. (Madras) Limited v. Shaika M. A. Majid and Co. (AIR 1967 SC 181), Trial Court found that Art.26 is applicable and Ext. A4(a) amounts to an account stated capable of counting a fresh period of limitation from that date. That is how the suit was decreed on the finding that it is not barred.

4 Under Art.18, time will begin to run from the date when the work is done because that is the date on which plaintiff gets cause of action to claim the amount. That is, when no time is fixed for payment. In this case, no time is fixed. Even though some time is mentioned in Ext. A1 order, that was not accepted and no claim is based on the time fixed in Ext. A1. Under Art.26, time begins to run from the date on which accounts are stated in writing signed by the defendant or his agent duly authorised on that behalf unless there is a simultaneous agreement in writing signed making the amount payable at a future date There is no case that there was such a simultaneous agreement. The works were completed in March 1975 and normally by March 1978, the period of limitation is over unless there was an acknowledgment within that time.

5 It is the undisputed duty of the plaintiff to satisfy the court that his plaint is within time. That must appear on the face of the plaint itself. Otherwise, under S.3 of the Limitation Act, the court is bound to dismiss the suit though limitation is not pleaded as a defence. Dates of orders and dates of demand mentioned in the plaint are not the starting points of limitation. If there is an acknowledgment under S.18, it must be in writing signed before the expiration of the period of limitation. The acknowledgment could be proved only by the signed writing and not by parole evidence. If exclusion of period is claimed under S.19 on the basis of payment, it must also be before the expiry of the period of limitation and the acknowledgment of payment must appear in the handwriting of or, in a writing signed by, the person making the payment or an authorised agent. It is true that though the payment must be within time, the acknowledgment can be out of time also provided it is before suit. Proof of acknowledgment by payment could only be by the writing so signed. The acknowledgment, whether under S.18 or 19, must be specifically pleaded in the plaint and proved by the signed writing. No such acknowledgments were pleaded and proved. The alleged payments on 4-4-1978 and 14-8-1979 not proved by any such acknowledgments are themselves out of time being after March 1978. This is a case in which the plaint as filed was prima facie barred by time.

6 Art.26 could be made applicable and the suit held within time only if Ext. A4 (a) is treated as an account stated in writing signed by the appellant or his duly authorised agent. It is only a statement of account sent by the respondent to the appellan